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In Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho,1 the U.S.-based 
online retail company filed a claim against a Korean2 
national who registered and used the domain name 
<amazoncar.com>. Internet users who resorted to this 
domain name were directed to a website (with content in 
Korean text) that offered to rent or lease Hyundai and Kia 
automobiles.3 Amazon.com, whose own website offered 
online sales of motor vehicles, in addition to books and other 
merchandise, argued that users would mistakenly associate 
the domain name with the U.S. company.4 The claim was 
decided – not in a civil action in a court of law stateside, 
Korea, or elsewhere, but instead – under the Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP” or 
“Policy”).5 Some background is in order.  
In 1999, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numerals (ICANN) adopted the UDRP to provide for 
an extrajudicial method of resolving disputes stemming 
from the abusive registration and use of a domain name in 
                                                
 
 
1 WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Dec. 20, 2001). Cho had also registered 
<amazonecar.com>. Id. 
2 All references to the country herein are to the Republic of Korea, 
commonly known as South Korea. 
3 Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276. 
4 Id.  
5 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORPORATION 
FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN) (1999), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en 
[hereinafter UDRP]. 
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violation of protected trademark rights,6 or 
“cybersquatting.”7 The Policy is incorporated by reference 
into every domain name registration agreement between an 
ICANN-accredited registrar and a registrant, and “sets forth 
the terms and conditions in connection with a dispute 
between [the registrant] and any party . . . over the 
registration and use of an Internet domain name registered 
by [the registrant].”8 Under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, a 
registrant is “required to submit to a mandatory 
administrative proceeding in the event that a third party (a 
‘complainant’) asserts . . . that  
(i)   [the] domain name is identical or 
confusingly similar to a trademark or 
service mark in which the complainant has 
rights; and 
(ii)   [the registrant] ha[s] no rights or legitimate 
interests in respect of the domain name; 
and 
                                                
 
 
6 See Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (Oct. 25, 1999), 
https://archive.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-
24oct99.htm [hereinafter ICANN, Second Staff Report]. ICANN adopted 
the UDRP on the basis of the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 
Final Report, The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual 
Property Issues, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO) 
(Apr. 30, 1999), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/report-
final1.pdf [hereinafter WIPO, Final Report], and the recommendations of 
others, ICANN, Second Staff Report, supra, ¶ 4.1.a.  
7 Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 16-17 (1st Cir. 
2001) (citing S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999)). 
8 UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 1. 
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(iii)  [the] domain name has been registered 
and is being used in bad faith.9  
 
In order for the complainant (i.e., the party objecting to the 
registration and use of the domain name) to prevail, it must 
prove that all of the three elements are present,10 whereupon 
an administrative panel of one or three members may order 
that the domain name be transferred to the complainant or 
cancelled.11 Of the UDRP proceedings that result in a panel 
decision, a significant majority (over 80%) are rendered in 
favor of the complainant.12 
ICANN does not itself administer the proceedings, 
nor does it decide any case.13 Instead, ICANN assigns the 
case management to approved dispute resolution service 
                                                
 
 
9 Id. ¶ 4(a). 
10 Id. 
11 These are the only remedies permitted under the Policy. Id. ¶ 4(i).  
12 As of May 2004, the most recent statistics provided by ICANN, in the 
decisions that resulted in a panel decision: nearly 81% of the subject 
domain names were transferred to the complainant (80.5%) or cancelled 
at the request of the complainant (0.4%); and 14.2% of the domain names 
stayed with the respondent. The remaining decisions were categorized 
under “Split decision.” Archived Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (May 10, 2004), 
https://archive.icann.org/en/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm. The statistics 
are similar for WIPO-administered UDRP cases as of June 30, 2015: 87.5% 
in favor of the complainant (85.88% transferred; 1.64% cancelled); and 
12.48% in favor of the respondent. Case Outcome (Consolidated): All Years, 
WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statistics/decision_rate.jsp?ye
ar= [hereinafter WIPO Case Outcomes]. 
13 UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(h); see id. ¶ 6. 
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providers.14 Each provider maintains a list of panelists from 
which it appoints panelists to decide cases on the merits.15 
Panel decisions are not necessarily binding, and do not have 
the force of a judicial ruling. That is, the UDRP does “not 
prevent either [the respondent] or the complainant from 
submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction 
for independent resolution before such mandatory 
administrative proceeding is commenced or after such 
proceeding is concluded.”16 Thus, even if the panel decides 
in favor of the complainant and orders cancellation or 
transfer of the domain name, ICANN will not implement the 
panel’s decision if the registrant commences a timely court 
action against the complainant.17 In practice, however, most 
registrants against whom a UDRP claim is brought do not 
participate in the proceeding,18 and do not resort to the 
                                                
 
 
14 The list of currently approved providers includes the Asian Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Centre, the National Arbitration Forum, 
WIPO, the Czech Arbitration Court Arbitration Center for Internet 
Disputes, and the Arab Center for Domain Name Dispute Resolution. 
List of Approved Dispute Resolution Service Providers, ICANN, 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/providers-6d-2012-02-25-en. 
15 Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN ¶ 6(a), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en 
[hereinafter UDRP Rules]. 
16 UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(k). 
17 Id.  
18 Professor Sorkin reported in 2001, “Default proceedings are 
commonplace; domain name registrants do not even file a response in 
one third to one half of all UDRP cases . . . .” David E. Sorkin, Judicial 
Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions, 18 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 42 (2001). The default rate in WIPO-
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courts to challenge the panel’s decision.19 As a result, 
ICANN’s implementation of the panel’s decision is the final 
action in the large majority of UDRP proceedings. 
Ultimately, the Policy provides for a streamlined, efficient, 
and inexpensive method of resolving disputes.20  
                                                                                                         
 
 
administered proceedings involving Korean parties is over 70%. Ilhyung 
Lee, The Korea Database: WIPO-Administered UDRP Decisions, the First 
Fifteen Years (2000-2014), 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 261, 309-10 (2015). 
19 For a list of court actions related to UDRP proceedings, see Selection of 
UDRP-related Court Cases, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/challenged/. 
20 The rules provide that the panel must forward its decision to the 
provider within fourteen days after the panel appointment, except in 
“exceptional circumstances.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 15(b). As 
WIPO notes:  
The main advantage of the UDRP Administrative 
Procedure is that it typically provides a faster and 
cheaper way to resolve a dispute regarding the 
registration and use of an Internet domain name than 
going to court. In addition, the procedures are 
considerably more informal than litigation and the 
decision-makers are experts in such areas as 
international trademark law, domain name issues, 
electronic commerce, the Internet and dispute 
resolution. It is also international in scope: it provides a 
single mechanism for resolving a domain name dispute 
regardless of where the registrar or the domain name 
holder or the complainant are located. 
WIPO Guide to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, WIPO 
(“A. Scope of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 
What Are the Advantages of the UDRP Administrative Procedure?”), 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/ [hereinafter WIPO 
Guide]. 
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The World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), based in Geneva, Switzerland, was the provider 
and case administrator in Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho.21 
The Policy provisions governed. Regarding procedural rules, 
ICANN’s Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (“UDRP Rules”)22 and the WIPO 
Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (“WIPO Supplemental Rules”)23 were in 
effect. WIPO appointed three panelists to decide the merits 
of the case: one each from the United States, Korea, and New 
Zealand. The panel issued a divided decision. The majority 
concluded that Amazon.com proved the three elements 
under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, and ordered the transfer 
of the domain names to the complainant.24 The Korean 
panelist dissented, stating that Amazon.com failed to satisfy 
the bad faith element.25 
                                                
 
 
21 WIPO was the first dispute resolution service provider accredited by 
ICANN and the first to receive cases under the UDRP. WIPO Guide, 
supra note 20 (“C. Preparing and Filing a Complaint, To Which Dispute 
Resolution Service Provider Do I Submit My Complaint?”). The 
complainant chooses the provider that will administer the proceeding by 
submitting the complaint to that provider. UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(d).  
22 ICANN originally approved the rules on October 24, 1999, and later 
approved amendments, on October 30, 2009, and September 28, 2013. See 
UDRP Rules, supra note 15. 
23 World Intellectual Property Organization Supplemental Rules for Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/rules/supplemental/ 
[hereinafter WIPO Supp. Rules]. 
24 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Dec. 
20, 2001). 
25 Id. (Hwang, Pan., dissenting). The majority’s decision and the separate 
dissenting opinion are discussed infra text accompanying notes 382-91. 
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The decision is an introductory example of an 
extrajudicial resolution of a domain name dispute in the 
international setting, and is similar in some respects to an 
international arbitration matter. The parties are from 
different countries and are involved in a dispute relating to 
an economic interest; legal standards and principles apply in 
the resolution of the claim. Rather than resorting to the 
courts (in the country of either party or another country), 
they seek a decision made by a private, neutral tribunal. The 
administering organization appoints three panelists to 
decide the case. In such cases, decisions are mostly 
unanimous, but there are occasional dissents. 
The Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho decision is one 
of fifty-eight WIPO-administered26 UDRP proceedings 
                                                                                                         
 
 
Currently, the domain names <amazoncar.com> and <amazonecar.com> 
both resolve to a link within Amazon.com’s main website at 
<amazon.com>, featuring “Automobile Parts and Accessories.” 
According to information available on <whois.com>, the current 
registrant of the domain names is listed as “Hostmaster, Amazon Legal 
Dept.” Whois amazoncar.com, WHOIS, 
http://www.whois.com/whois/amazoncar.com; Whois amazonecar.com, 
WHOIS, http://www.whois.com/whois/amazonecar.com. 
26 All WIPO-administered UDRP decisions are publicly available on its 
Internet site. Search WIPO Cases and WIPO Panel Decisions, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/; Index of WIPO UDRP 
Panel Decisions, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/legalindex.jsp. In 
addition, WIPO provides a summary of panel decisions on key 
procedural and substantive issues that commonly arise. WIPO Overview 
of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Second Edition, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/overview2.0/ 
[hereinafter WIPO Overview 2.0]. The consensus or clear majority views 
on some issues are indicated, as well as other questions that have 
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involving Korean parties27 decided by a three-member 
panel, from the beginning of the implementation of the 
UDRP in 1999 to the end of 2014 (“58 decisions”). This article 
provides a summary of the 58 decisions and offers analysis 
of selected cases. This study is an extension of a separate 
work that surveys all 818 WIPO-administered UDRP 
proceedings28 that include a party connected to Korea – “one 
of the world’s most-wired countries.”29 The decisions of the 
three-member panels herein reflect the collective 
deliberations of the (often international) panelists, which 
decisions elaborate on specific provisions of the Policy and 
the UDRP Rules, and also occasionally include separate 
opinions and disagreement within the tribunal. Because any 
discussion of the UDRP proceeding will remind of the 
arbitration method as alluded to above, the discussion 
begins in Part I with a clarification and elaboration: a UDRP 
matter is not one of arbitration, although there are 
                                                                                                         
 
 
attracted “a diversity of views.” Id. WIPO notes that although neither 
WIPO Overview 2.0 nor prior panel decisions are binding on the panels, 
“predictability remains a key element of dispute resolution systems.” Id. 
27 For purposes of this study, the nationality of each party is taken from 
its address as indicated in the text of the decision. There is one caveat. 
The address of the respondent party is often based on unverified 
information provided by the registrant at the time of the domain name 
registration. 
28 Lee, supra note 18. 
29 Sang-Hun Choe, South Koreans Connect Through Search Engine, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 5, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/05/technology/05online.html?_r=0
&pagewanted=print (describing Korea as “one of the world’s most-
wired countries”). 
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similarities between the two, and indeed, the basics of an 
international arbitration are reflected in a UDRP proceeding. 
Part II elaborates on the interpretation and application of 
various provisions of the Policy that govern the resolution of 
a UDRP dispute, as indicated by the three-member panels 
from the 58 proceedings. This part includes a separate 
discussion devoted to the minority of decisions where the 
panel denied the complaint, thus allowing the respondent to 
retain the domain name. Finally, with the characteristics of 
international commercial arbitration practice in mind, Part 
III highlights ten of the 58 decisions that yielded separate 
views by individual panelists. These ten decisions bring to 
light disagreement among the panelists. A critique is also 
offered for some separate opinions. An appendix of all 58 
decisions completes the article. 
 
I.   UDRP AND ARBITRATION 
 
The UDRP drafters considered arbitration as the 
method to resolve domain name disputes, but decided 
against it.30 As explained herein, a proceeding under the 
UDRP is not arbitration; the commentary has affirmed this 
point.31 Moreover, U.S. courts have ruled that for purposes 
                                                
 
 
30 WIPO, Final Report, supra note 6, ¶ 234. 
31 E.g., Ljiljana Biukovic, International Commercial Arbitration in Cyberspace: 
Recent Developments, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 319, 337 (2002); A. Michael 
Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy” – Causes and 
(Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 687 (2002); Sorkin, supra, note 18, at 
41-42; Richard E. Speidel, ICANN Domain Name Dispute Resolution, the 
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Limitations of Modern Arbitration 
Law, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 167, 171-72 (2002). 
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of the Federal Arbitration Act,32 a UDRP decision does not 
qualify as an arbitration award.33 Yet some commentators,34 
courts,35 and UDRP panelists36 have imprecisely referred to 
                                                
 
 
32 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2016). 
33 E.g., Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 372 (3d Cir. 2003); Parisi v. 
Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 745-46 (E.D. Va. 2001). See Storey 
v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C, 347 F.3d 370, 381 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Unlike 
traditional binding arbitration proceedings, UDRP proceedings are 
structured specially to permit the domain-name registrant two bites at 
the apple.”). 
34 E.g., Jordan A. Arnot, Navigating Cybersquatting Enforcement in the 
Expanding Internet, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 321, 329, 330 
(2014) (“UDRP is an international arbitration process established by 
ICANN”; “UDRP arbitration proceeding”); Stephen McJohn, Top Tens of 
2013: Patent, Trademark, Copyright, and Trade Secret Cases, 12 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 177, 197 (2014) (“arbitration under the UDRP”); Gideon 
Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 225 (“arbitration under the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy”); Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: 
Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 355 
(“4,000 arbitrations under the UDRP”); Allan R. Stein, Parochialism and 
Pluralism in Cyberspace Regulation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2012 (2005) 
(“international arbitration . . . pursuant to the resolution dispute policy 
of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers”); Jason 
Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethics Rules Can Be Used To Address 
Trademark Bullying, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 503, 507 (2013) (“(UDRP), which 
governs domain name arbitrations in the current gTLD domain 
system”); Recent Cases, Cyberlaw – Trademark Law – WIPO Arbitrators 
Uphold Conjunctive View of Bad Faith Under the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2130, 2130, 2133 (2014) 
(“(UDRP), a system of international arbitration”; “arbitrations under the 
UDRP”)).  
35 E.g., ISystems v. Spark Networks, Ltd., No. 10-10905, 2012 WL 3101672, 
at *3 n.11 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 2012) (per curiam) (“arbitration pursuant to 
the UDRP”; “UDRP arbitrations”); Calista Enters. Ltd. v. Tenza Trading 
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the UDRP process as “arbitration.”37 More precisely, the 
UDRP provides for an administrative proceeding, in contrast to 
arbitration.38  
                                                                                                         
 
 
Ltd., No. 3:13–cv–01045–SI, 2014 WL 3670856, at *1 (D. Or. July 23, 2014) 
(“UDRP arbitration panel”); Parker Waichman Alonso LLP v. Orlando 
Firm, P.C., No. 09 Civ. 7401(CM), 2010 WL 1956871 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 
14, 2010) (“Arbitration decisions governed by the UDRP”); Olympic 
Sports Data Servs., Ltd. v. Maselli, Misc. Action No. 07-117, 2010 WL 
310772, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2010) (“arbitration under the UDRP”); 
Bord v. Banco de Chile, 205 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“This 
arbitration procedure mandated by the accreditation agreement is the 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedure (hereinafter ‘UDRP’).”). 
36 E.g., Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Li XiaoLi, WIPO Case No. D2012-
1401 (Sept. 5, 2012) (referring to “[m]any UDR arbitration panelists”); 
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. #1 Viagra Propecia Xenical & More Online 
Pharm., WIPO Case No. D2003-0793 (Nov. 30, 2003) (“the majority of 
UDRP arbitration decisions”). See Baltimore Museum of Art, Inc. v. Mo 
Domains, WIPO Case No. D2005-0720 (Sept. 1, 2005) (“adverse ICANN 
UDRP arbitrations”); Groupe Industriel Marcel Dassault v. Mr. Minwoo 
Park, WIPO Case No. D2003-0989 (Feb. 12, 2004) (“the arbitration 
proceeding will be unduly delayed”); Cognigen Networks, Inc. v. 
Pharm. Outcomes Research, WIPO Case No. D2001-1094 (Dec. 18, 2001) 
(“the Complainant’s pursuit of this UDRP arbitration”).  
37 Perhaps there is understandable reason for the confusion. All publicly 
available UDRP decisions administered by WIPO have at the top of the 
first page the caption, WIPO “Arbitration and Mediation Center.” In 
addition to UDRP proceedings, WIPO provides administration services 
for arbitration and mediation. WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, 
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/background.html. 
Another ICANN-approved dispute resolution service provider is the 
National Arbitration Forum (NAF). NAF’s Internet site includes a 
searchable database for its UDRP decisions under various fields, 
including “Arbitrator.” Domain Name Dispute Proceedings and Decisions, 
NAF, http://www.adrforum.com/SearchDecisions. 
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Black’s Law Dictionary reports that “arbitration” in 
English was first used in the fifteenth century.39 Over time, 
there have been many meanings. For purposes of discussion 
herein, this article adopts a definition contained in a 
previous edition of Black’s: “The reference of a dispute to an 
impartial (third) person chosen by the parties to the dispute 
who agree in advance to abide by the arbitrator’s award 
issued after a hearing at which both parties have an 
opportunity to be heard.”40 The elements of the basic 
                                                                                                         
 
 
38 Froomkin, supra note 31, at 687. Then Circuit Judge Sotomayor 
emphasized the “administrative proceeding” phrasing, and used it 
throughout her opinion in Storey, 347 F.3d at 376. The Policy specifies 
that a proceeding brought under it is a “mandatory administrative 
proceeding” or “administrative proceeding.” UDRP, supra note 5, ¶¶ 
3(c), 4, 4(a), 4(h), 4(k), 5, 8(a), 8(b). The panel that decides the dispute is 
the “Panel” or “Administrative Panel.” Id. ¶¶ 3(c), 4(b), 4(c), & (e)-(k). 
The UDRP Rules further define: “Panel means an administrative panel 
appointed by a Provider to decide a complaint concerning a domain-
name registration”; and “Panelist means an individual appointed by a 
Provider to be a member of a Panel.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 1. 
There are four references to “arbitration” and one to “arbitrator” in the 
text of the Policy, all directed to a proceeding separate from the UDRP 
proceeding. UDRP, supra note 5, ¶¶ 5, 8(a), 8(b). 
39 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY xxxi & 125 (10th ed. 2014). 
40 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979). These elements are present 
in provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2016). 
Section 2 of the Act provides that an arbitration agreement is 
enforceable; section 4 gives the district court the authority to compel 
arbitration; section 9 allows the court to issue an order confirming the 
award; section 10 provides the limited grounds on which a court may 
vacate the award and which grounds the Supreme Court has ruled are 
exclusive. Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008). 
Section 10 also refers to a “hearing.” 9 U.S.C. § 10. Black’s tenth edition 
2016 THE FIFTY-EIGHT PROCEEDINGS 443 
definition most relevant here are: (i) the agreement by the 
parties to resort to the extrajudicial procedure and (ii) the 
binding nature of the impartial panel’s award. These 
essential aspects of arbitration are not present in the UDRP 
process. 
Foremost, “[a]rbitration can only take place if both 
parties have agreed to it.”41 In a UDRP proceeding, there is 
no agreement at all between the two parties – the respondent 
(the registrant of a disputed domain name) and the 
complainant (who alleges that the registrant’s registration of 
the domain name violates the complainant’s trademark 
rights).42 The only operative agreement is between the 
registrant and the registrar, in which the registrant agrees, 
inter alia, to submit a dispute to an administrative 
proceeding brought by a complainant that is not known at 
the time of the agreement. The complainant is not a party to 
the agreement. Some commentators suggest that the UDRP 
process triggers a form of “third party beneficiary” 
arbitration.43 But again, this approach departs from the basic 
                                                                                                         
 
 
defines arbitration as follows: “A dispute-resolution process in which the 
disputing parties choose one or more neutral third parties to make a final 
and binding decision resolving the dispute. . . . The parties to the dispute 
may choose a third party directly by mutual agreement, or indirectly, 
such as by agreeing to have an arbitration organization select the third 
party.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 39, at 125.  
41 What Is Arbitration?, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/what-is-arb.html. 
42 See Speidel, supra note 31, at 172-73. 
43 A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN To Route 
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 135 (2000) (referring 
to “UDRP-like mandatory third-party beneficiary clauses that created 
arbitration rights for any aggrieved trademark holder”). See Benjamin G. 
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definition of arbitration, which requires an agreement 
between the principals. Moreover, by agreeing to the 
arbitration method, the parties waive their right of access to 
the courts for the resolution of their dispute on the merits,44 
and in the U.S., the right to a jury trial.45 Once the parties 
agree to resort to arbitration and the arbitration panel issues 
an award, a court may refuse to recognize the award46 or 
                                                                                                         
 
 
Davis, Une Magouille Planetaire: The UDRP Is an International Scam, 72 
MISS. L.J. 815, 862 n.74 (2002) (referring to “the contours of the third 
party beneficiary relationship for the registry/registrar with the parties 
to the dispute once a complaint is filed”); Froomkin, supra note 31, at 612 
(referring to ICANNN “requir[ing] registries (and also registrars) to 
promise to subject all registrants to a mandatory third-party beneficiary 
clause in which every registrant agrees to submit to ICANN’s UDRP 
upon the request of aggrieved third parties who believe they have a 
superior claim to the registrant’s domain name).  
44 Belom v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, 284 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The 
right to an Article III forum is not absolute and may be waived. Where 
an individual consents to arbitration, he waives the right to an impartial 
and independent adjudication.”) (citing Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986); Marsh v. First USA Bank, 
N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 921 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (“[A] valid arbitration 
provision . . . waives the right to resolve a dispute through litigation in a 
judicial forum . . . .”); Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: 
Arbitration, Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants As a Hybrid From of 
Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 381 (2006) (“Mandatory 
arbitration agreements . . . waive the right to litigate future legal claims 
in a judicial forum in favor of arbitration . . . .”). 
45 E.g., Marsh, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 921; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 
S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. 2004). 
46 In the international setting, the New York Convention provides for the 
seven grounds on which courts of a contracting party may refuse 
recognition of an arbitration award. Convention on the Recognition and 
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may vacate the award47 only on very limited grounds. 
Perhaps the consequences of the arbitration method explain 
the requirement that the effecting arbitration agreement 
between the parties be in writing.48 
To emphasize, a UDRP panel’s decision on the merits 
is not binding,49 or more technically, there is no agreement 
between the parties that the decision will be binding. As 
                                                                                                         
 
 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
47 For the limited grounds for vacating an award in the U.S., see Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2016). See UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, G.A. Res. 40/72, art. 34(2), U.N. 
Doc. A/40/17/Annex I & A/61/17/Annex I (June 21, 1985) (model 
arbitration law’s grounds). 
48 New York Convention, supra note 46, art. II(1) (“Each Contracting State 
shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake 
to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which 
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, 
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of 
settlement by arbitration.”) (emphasis added); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 
U.S.C. § 2 (2016) (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction . . . or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an 
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”) (emphasis 
added). The reason for imposing the writing requirement in arbitration 
agreements “is self-evident. A valid agreement to arbitrate excludes the 
jurisdiction of the courts and makes arbitration an exclusive method for 
dispute resolution.” Nilanjana Chatterjee, Arbitration Proceedings under 
ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy - Myth or Reality, 
10 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 67, 84-85 (2006). 
49 See Sorkin, supra note 18, at 42; Speidel, supra note 31, at 174-75. 
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indicated earlier, even if the panel decides in favor of the 
complainant and orders a transfer or cancellation of the 
domain name, the respondent may avoid ICANN’s 
implementation of the panel decision by bringing an action 
in court.50 Indeed, either party may ignore the UDRP 
proceeding altogether and seek resolution in the courts 
before, during, or after the proceeding.51   
Even though the UDRP procedure does not fit within 
the traditional definition of arbitration, there are important 
similarities between a UDRP proceeding and arbitration.52 
Foremost and fundamentally, both offer an extrajudicial 
method to resolve a dispute over a commercial interest as an 
alternative to adjudication in the courts. There is also often 
an international component in many UDRP and arbitration 
proceedings, when the parties are of different nationalities, 
cultures, and languages. The UDRP proceeding (and some 
                                                
 
 
50 UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(k).   
51 The current edition of Black’s has an entry for “nonbinding 
arbitration.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 39, at 126. The phrase 
has been used to describe a UDRP proceeding, e.g., Bord v. Banco de 
Chile, 205 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 2002); Sherry, supra note 34, at 
354; Stephen J. Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the Arbitration-Law 
Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. 
L. 129, 149 (2002). The term is a “misnomer . . . because arbitration is usu. 
intended to result in a final, binding award.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 39, at 126. In my view, except for the rare situation where the 
parties agree to disregard the arbitration award and instead agree on a 
settlement (with party autonomy reigning supreme), an arbitration by 
definition cannot be nonbinding. 
52 See Holger P. Hestermeyer, The Invalidity of ICANN’s UDRP Under 
National Law, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 44 (2002); Julia Hörnle, The 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Procedure: Is Too Much of a Good 
Thing a Bad Thing?, 11 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 254 (2008). 
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arbitration matters) involves an institutional case manager53 
who oversees the conduct of the proceeding, under specified 
rules and guidelines. In addition, several features of the 
UDRP procedure appear to be borrowed from the 
international arbitration model, especially relating to the 
panels (and individual panelists) that decide the dispute. 
Specifically, these features address (1) the panelists’ 
qualifications; (2) the panelists’ required disclosures before 
and after appointment; (3) the number of panelists 
comprising the panel; (4) party involvement in the selection 
of panelists; (5) the role of the presiding panelist (or chair); 
(6) the nationality of the panelists; and (7) the powers and 
authority of the panels during the proceeding. These 
characteristics are addressed in order. 
(1) Regarding the qualifications of tribunal members, 
the major international arbitral organizations impose a basic 
requirement that every arbitrator be “impartial and 
independent.”54 The UDRP Rules repeat this very phrasing 
                                                
 
 
53 In arbitration, the parties may agree to craft the procedures of the 
arbitration themselves (ad hoc arbitration), or to abide by the rules and 
practices of an administering organization (institutional arbitration). See 
generally Gerald Aksen, Ad Hoc Versus Institutional Arbitration, 2 ICC 
ICARB. BULL. 8 (1991).    
54 Am. Arbitration Assoc., International Arbitration Rules, art. 13(1) 
(2014) [hereinafter AAA Rules]; Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration 
Rules, art. 11(1) (2012) [hereinafter ICC Rules]; London Court of Int’l 
Arbitration, Arbitration Rules, art. 5.3 (2014) [hereinafter LCIA Rules]. 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, the leading rules for ad hoc arbitrations, 
provide, “The appointing authority shall have regard to such 
considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent 
and impartial arbitrator . . . .” G.A. Res. 68/109, art. 6(7), U.N. GAOR, 
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for the administrative panel.55 WIPO offers that its panelists 
are “well-reputed for their impartiality, sound judgement 
and experience as decision-makers, as well as their 
substantive experience in the areas of intellectual property 
law, electronic commerce and the Internet.”56 (2) A 
prospective arbitrator must disclose any circumstances that 
might give rise to “justifiable doubts” as to her impartiality 
or independence.57 Some organizations add that such doubt 
or question should be considered in “the eyes”58 or “the 
mind”59 of the parties. A UDRP panelist is likewise under a 
duty to disclose “any circumstances giving rise to justifiable 
                                                                                                         
 
 
68th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/109 (Dec. 16, 2013) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules]. 
55 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 7. 
56 WIPO Domain Name Panelists, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/panel.html. See also WIPO 
Guide, supra note 20 (“E. Who Are the Panelists”) (“The persons 
appearing on the WIPO Center’s list of Domain Name Panelists have 
been selected on the basis of their well-established reputation for their 
impartiality, sound judgment and experience as decision-makers, as well 
as their substantive experience in the areas of international trademark 
law, electronic commerce and Internet-related issues.”).  
57 AAA Rules, supra note 54, art. 13(2); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 5.4; 
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, art. 11. See ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 
11(2) (requiring disclosure of “any facts or circumstances which might be 
of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator’s independence in 
the eyes of the parties, as well as any circumstances that could give rise 
to reasonable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality”). 
58 ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 11(2). 
59 LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 5.4.  
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doubt as to the Panelist’s impartiality or independence,”60 to 
which WIPO practice adds that the question of 
independence be considered “in the eyes of one or both of 
the parties.”61  
(3) With respect to the number of arbitrators, the rules 
of most administering organizations provide that a single 
arbitrator will preside over the arbitration, unless the parties 
agree on a different number, or the organization in its 
discretion determines that a three-member tribunal is 
necessary.62 In a UDRP proceeding, a sole panelist decides 
the case,63 unless either the complainant or the respondent 
elects to have the dispute decided by a panel with three 
members.64 (4) In an arbitration, if a single arbitrator is to 
decide the dispute, the administering organization appoints 
the arbitrator, unless the parties agree on a different 
procedure.65 In a UDRP proceeding, the provider appoints a 
                                                
 
 
60 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 7. The duty to disclose is a continuing 
one. Id.  
61 Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, 
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/statement/panel.html. 
62 AAA Rules, supra note 54, art. 11; ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 12(2); 
LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 5.8. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, 
art. 7.   
63 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 6(b). 
64 Id. ¶ 6(c). If the complainant elects to have a three-member panel, the 
complainant must pay the applicable fees. If the complainant elects a 
single panelist and the respondent elects to have three panelists, the 
parties must share the fees of a three-member panel. Id. 
65 AAA Rules, supra note 54, arts. 12(1) & (6); ICC Rules, supra note 54, 
art. 12(3); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, art. 8(1). The LCIA takes a 
different approach: “No party or third person may appoint any 
arbitrator under the Arbitration Agreement: the LCIA Court alone is 
empowered to appoint arbitrators (albeit taking into account any written 
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single panelist from its list of approved panelists.66 Where an 
arbitration agreement provides for three arbitrators, some 
arbitral organizations allow each party to nominate one of 
the arbitrators.67 In a UDRP proceeding with a three-member 
panel, there is also party involvement in the selection of the 
panelists – each party is to provide a list of three candidates, 
“drawn from any ICANN-approved Provider’s list of 
panelists,” to serve as one of the panelists.68 The rules also 
state that the provider “shall endeavor” to appoint one 
panelist from the list of candidates provided by each of the 
parties.69  
                                                                                                         
 
 
agreement or joint nomination by the parties).” LCIA Rules, supra note 
54, art. 5.7.   
66 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 6(b). 
67 ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 12(4); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 5.8; 
see UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, art. 9(1) (“If three arbitrators are to 
be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator.”). 
68 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶¶ 3(b)(iv), 5(b)(v), 6(d). The WIPO 
Supplemental Rules add that the party must indicate its order of 
preference. WIPO Supp. Rules, supra note 23, ¶ 7(a).     
69 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 6(e). The WIPO Supplemental Rules state 
that in appointing a panelist in this situation, WIPO “shall, subject to 
availability, respect the order of preference indicated by a Party.” WIPO 
Supp. Rules, supra note 23, ¶ 7(a). In the event that a provider is unable 
to confirm timely the appointment of a panelist from either party’s list of 
candidates, “the Provider shall make that appointment from its list of 
panelists.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 6(e). Also, if the complainant 
elects to have a three-member panel and the respondent defaults, WIPO 
“shall, subject to availability, appoint one Panelist from the names 
submitted by the Complainant and shall appoint the second Panelist and 
the Presiding Panelist from its published list.” WIPO Supp. Rules, supra 
note 23, ¶ 7(c)(ii). 
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(5) In an arbitration with three arbitrators, one of the 
arbitrators serves as the chair or presiding arbitrator of the 
tribunal. This is of practical significance in that she, as first 
among equals, serves a leading role in the conduct of the 
arbitration, may vote to break ties when the party-
nominated arbitrators disagree,70 and takes on the principal 
responsibility of drafting the resulting award. The rules of 
one administering organization provide that it will select the 
president of the arbitral tribunal unless the parties have 
agreed on another procedure.71 Another method seen in 
practice is for the two party-appointed arbitrators to select 
the presiding arbitrator.72 For proceedings under the UDRP, 
“The third Panelist shall be appointed by the Provider from 
a list of five candidates submitted by the Provider to the 
Parties, the Provider’s selection from among the five being 
made in a manner that reasonably balances the preferences 
of both Parties, as they may specify to the Provider . . . .”73 
ICANN’s UDRP documents do not specify the role or the 
title of the third panelist, but the WIPO Supplemental Rules 
provide that the third panelist “shall be the Presiding 
Panelist.”74  
                                                
 
 
70 See ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 31(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 
26.5; UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, art. 33(2). 
71 ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 12(5).  
72 UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 54, art. 9(1).  
73 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 6(e). From the list of candidates for the 
presiding panelist, each party may indicate its order of preference. WIPO 
Supp. Rules, supra note 23, ¶ 7(b)(ii). The WIPO Supplemental Rules 
provide that “[n]otwithstanding the procedure provided for in 
Paragraph 6(e) of the [UDRP Rules], the Parties may jointly agree on the 
identity of the Presiding Panelist.” Id. ¶ 7(b)(iii).   
74 WIPO Supp. Rules, supra note 23, ¶ 7(b)(i). 
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(6) Where an arbitration involves opposing parties 
from different countries, the nationality of the arbitrator 
deciding the case is of some moment.75 Most arbitral rules 
address the nationality of the parties or arbitrators 
explicitly.76 Some provide that where the parties are of 
different nationalities, the sole panelist or the chair must be 
of a nationality other than those of the parties, unless the 
parties agree otherwise.77 Given that many disputes under 
the UDRP involve parties from different countries, perhaps 
it is surprising that the Policy, the UDRP Rules, and the 
WIPO Supplemental Rules do not specifically mention the 
nationality of the parties or panelists. WIPO does note that 
its list of panelists “is international, consisting of some 400 
Panelists from over 50 countries, many of whom are multi-
lingual.”78 Especially because some proceedings involve 
                                                
 
 
75 For a discussion of the nationality of the arbitrator in international 
commercial arbitration, see Ilhyung Lee, Practice and Predicament: The 
Nationality of the International Arbitrator, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 603 (2008). 
76 E.g., AAA Rules, supra note 54, art. 12(4) (“At the request of any party 
or on its own initiative, the Administrator may appoint nationals of a 
country other than that of any of the parties.”); ICC Rules, supra note 54, 
art. 13(1) (“In confirming or appointing arbitrators, the [ICC] shall 
consider the prospective arbitrator’s nationality, residence and other 
relationships with the countries of which the parties or the other 
arbitrators are nationals. . . .”) (emphasis added); see UNCITRAL Rules, 
supra note 54, art. 6.7 (“The appointing authority . . . shall take into 
account the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other 
than the nationalities of the parties.”) (emphasis added).   
77 ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 13(5); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 6.1. 
78 WIPO Guide, supra note 20 (“E. Who Are the Panelists”). See WIPO 
Domain Name Panelists, supra note 56 (“WIPO panelists come from 
different regions of the world . . . .”).  
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more than one language,79 it is likely that the nationality of 
the parties and prospective panelists is taken into account 
when providers appoint individual panelists. In a UDRP 
proceeding where the complainant and respondent are from 
different countries, a three-member panel whose 
composition includes both nationalities will contribute to 
party confidence in the system.80  
(7) Once appointed, the arbitrator has wide discretion 
in conducting the arbitration.81 In contrast to the arbitrator, 
the tasks of the UDRP panelist are more circumscribed, 
especially given that generally the proceeding does not 
allow for discovery (of the type seen in U.S. civil actions) or 
in-person hearings.82 Yet the UDRP panel has similar 
discretion and authority to “conduct the administrative 
                                                
 
 
79 The UDRP Rules address the matter of the language of the proceeding. 
UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 11. For a decision discussing the rule, see 
infra text accompanying notes 265-71. 
80 A discussion of the composition of the panels in the 58 decisions 
herein, by nationality of the panelists, appears infra text accompanying 
notes 376-77. 
81 AAA Rules, supra note 54, art. 20(1) (“Subject to these Rules, the 
arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it 
considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality 
and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair 
opportunity to present its case.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 14.5 
(“The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the widest discretion to discharge 
these general duties, subject to such mandatory law(s) or rules of law as 
the Arbitral Tribunal may decide to be applicable . . . .”). 
82 Paragraph 13 of the UDRP Rules states: “There shall be no in-person 
hearings (including hearings by teleconference, videoconference, and 
web conference), unless the Panel determines, in its sole discretion and 
as an exceptional matter, that such a hearing is necessary for deciding 
the complaint.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 13. 
454 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
proceeding in such manner as it considers appropriate in 
accordance with the Policy and these Rules”83 and 
“determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and 
weight of the evidence.”84 Toward a decision, the panel may 
consider, in addition to the party submissions and the UDRP 
documents, “any rules and principles of law that it deems 
applicable.”85 
With this background in hand, we turn to the 
decisions of the UDRP panels in the 58 proceedings 
involving Korean parties.  
 
II.   THE COMPLAINANT’S CASE AND THE RESPONDENT’S   
DEFENSE, BY THE 58 DECISIONS 
 
A.   THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS 
 
As one panel stated, “The overriding objective of the 
Policy is to prevent abusive domain name registration and 
use for the benefit of legitimate trademark owners . . . .”86 To 
reiterate, under paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, in order for the 
complainant to obtain transfer or cancellation of the 
disputed domain name, it must show that: the domain name 
“is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service 
mark in which the complainant has rights”; the respondent 
has “no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain 
                                                
 
 
83 Id. ¶ 10(a). 
84 Id. ¶ 10(d). 
85 Id. ¶ 15(a). 
86 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (citing Telstra Corp. v. 
Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003 (Feb. 18, 2000)). 
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name”; and the domain name “has been registered and is 
being used in bad faith.”87 WIPO-administered decisions 
typically include the panel’s disposition of each of the three 
elements of paragraph 4(a).88 This Part highlights and 
elaborates on the requisite elements, as interpreted and 
applied by the panels in the 58 decisions. 
 
1.   DOMAIN NAME IS “IDENTICAL OR CONFUSINGLY 
SIMILAR TO A TRADEMARK OR SERVICE MARK IN 
WHICH THE COMPLAINANT HAS RIGHTS” 
 
The complainant having rights in a trademark or 
service mark is a prerequisite to the question of whether the 
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that 
mark.89 In the large majority of UDRP decisions, the 
complainant demonstrates such rights by registration and 
use. In most cases, registration is presumptive evidence of 
valid rights.90 In those instances where the complainant did 
                                                
 
 
87 UDRP, supra note 15, ¶ 4(a).  
88 In one of the 58 decisions, the panel’s discussion of paragraph 4(a) is 
limited to the bad faith element in 4(a)(iii), and does not address directly 
the other two elements. JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais 
Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim, WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 
2013). 
89 Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., WIPO Case No. 
D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008).  
90 In one decision, the respondent invited the panel to disregard the 
registration of a mark (“JET TOURS”), urging that it was descriptive or 
generic. Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 
(May 26, 2006). The panel declined, stating, “[I]t is only in very limited 
circumstances that a Panel may examine the circumstances of a 
trademark registration to determine whether the registration satisfies the 
requirements of the Policy (e.g. in cases where the trademark registration 
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not register the mark, it may nevertheless demonstrate 
common law rights91 through use. For example, in 
Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc.,92 although 
“shoulderdoc.co.uk” was not a registered mark, the panel 
determined that the complainant’s use of the term on its 
website and in its brochure satisfied the preliminary 
requirement of rights in a mark. Noting that the 
complainant’s use would allow the public to see the mark as 
indicating the origin of services, the panel found that “the 
Complainant is likely to have generated sufficient reputation 
and goodwill in the name <shoulderdoc.co.uk> . . . to have 
acquired common law rights in a shoulderdoc.co.uk mark in 
England and Wales.”93 Evidence of trademark rights in any 
country is sufficient for purposes of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the 
Policy.94 Indeed, the complainant need not necessarily show 
rights in the country of the respondent or the registrar.95  
                                                                                                         
 
 
is automatic or unexamined, as occurs with the United States state 
registrations).” Id. 
91 Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 (May 
20, 2009). 
92 WIPO Case No. D2006-0625 (Sept. 8, 2006). 
93 Id. The source-indicating function is indeed the “hallmark of a 
trademark,” Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 
134 F.3d 749, 755 (6th Cir. 1998), and a definitional component, Lanham 
Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (definition for “Trademark” 
includes use “to indicate the source of the goods”).  
94 Reckitt Benckiser Plc, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239; IPGM Inst. Mixte de 
Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, WIPO Case No. D2007-
1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (citation omitted). 
95 But trademark rights in other countries, and the extent to which the 
mark is known worldwide, may be relevant to the question of whether 
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In two of the 58 decisions, the panel held that the 
complainant failed to show that it had rights in a mark. In 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Unitedeurope Consulting,96 the 
complainant had registrations for various marks beginning 
with the “T-” prefix, including “T-BIZ”, “T-BOX”, “T-CITY”, 
“T-HOME”, “T-JOBS”, “T-NETWORK”, “T-HEALTH”, “T-
PORTAL”, and “T-SALES”, which corresponded to nine of 
the eleven disputed domain names. The complainant argued 
that it also had trademark rights relating to <t-
broadcast.com> and <t-show.com>, relying on its European 
Community registrations for “T” and non-registered marks 
rights to “T-[descriptive term].” The panel disagreed, stating 
that “[s]uch a finding with regard to trademark rights would 
be overly broad.”97  
In the proceeding involving the domain name 
<gopets.net>, the panel determined that there was no 
evidence to support registered trademark rights or 
“common law (i.e.[,] unregistered) trademark rights.”98 
There, the complainant sought to obtain rights based on the 
registration and use of its own domain name <gopets.com> 
(which was not the subject of the proceeding). The 
                                                                                                         
 
 
the respondent was aware of the complainant’s mark and was acting in 
bad faith under paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.  
96 WIPO Case No. D2006-0930 (Dec. 27, 2006). 
97 The panel reasoned that “such an issue is one that is more proper for 
the relevant trademark offices and courts of law – not these 
administrative proceedings.” Id. 
98 Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., WIPO Case No. 
D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008). The two parties in the proceeding were also 
involved in an action in the U.S. district court, brought by the 
respondent. See infra text accompanying notes 224-27 & note 230.  
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complainant had registered the domain name nine years 
before its commencement of the UDRP proceeding, and had 
developed a marketing plan and referred to “development 
tasks” concerning the intended website. The panel ruled that 
these were insufficient to show trademark rights: “The 
Complainant’s preparatory plans and research do not show 
that it has used a mark ‘in trade’. It merely indicates an 
intention to do so. But such an intention does not show that 
it has actually been done . . . .”99 
Once rights in a mark are established, the panel’s 
discussion turns to the question of whether the domain 
name is identical or confusingly similar to the complainant’s 
mark. This entails an objective test, a comparison between 
the complainant’s mark and the domain name at issue.100 For 
purposes of this comparison under paragraph 4(a)(i), the 
presence of the generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) (e.g., “-
.com” or “-.net”), a technical requirement in every domain 
name, is generally disregarded.101 Thus, panels have 




100 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (citing Magnum Piering, Inc. 
v. Mudjackers & Garwood S. Wilson, Sr., WIPO Case No. D2000-1525 
(Jan. 29, 2001)); Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. 
D2007-0417 (July 5, 2007). One panel added that this comparison is 
“independent of the use factors usually considered in a traditional 
trademark infringement action.” IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du 
Groupe Mornay, WIPO Case No. D2007-1513. 
101 Mobile’s Republic v. Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089 
(Apr. 23, 2014); Deutsche Lufthansa AG v. [] Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO 
Case No. D2013-1844 (Jan. 22, 2014); Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. 
Ho Kyoung Trading Co, Ltd., Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 
(Oct. 17, 2011); Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, WIPO Case No. 
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determined that the first element of paragraph 4(a) was 
satisfied in decisions involving the following domain names: 
<carfax.net>;102 <chivas.net>;103 <ifil.com>;104 <itau.com>;105 
<maxell.net>;106 <sony.net>;107 and <samsung.com.ve>.108 
These domain names were challenged by the respective 
complainant whose mark appeared in full in the domain 
name, followed by the gTLD. Panels have also found 
confusing similarity where the domain name incorporates 
the complainant’s mark, with the only difference being the 
alteration of a letter (<herts.com>109); the deletion of a letter 
                                                                                                         
 
 
D2009-0239 (May 20, 2009); IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe 
Mornay, WIPO Case No. D2007-1513; STX LLC v. Yu nae ho, WIPO Case 
No. D2006-0567 (Aug. 14, 2006); Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO 
Case No. D2006-0250 (May 26, 2006); Carfax, Inc. v. COMn.COM, WIPO 
Case No. D2002-0513 (Sept. 18, 2002). See WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 
26, ¶ 1.2 (“The applicable top-level suffix in the domain name . . . would 
usually be disregarded under the confusing similarity test . . . .”). 
102 Carfax, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2002-0513. 
103 Chivas Bros. Ltd. v. Anyweb Co., WIPO Case No. D2006-1446 (Feb. 2, 
2007). 
104 IFIL S.p.A v. Han Jin Go, WIPO Case No. D2007-0535 (Aug. 15, 2007). 
105 Banco Itau S.A. v. Webmedia, WIPO Case No. D2008-0531 (July 18, 
2008). 
106 Hitachi Maxell Kabushiki Kaisha v. Gyuhwa Chung, WIPO Case No. 
D2003-0079 (May 1, 2003) [in Korean]. 
107 Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. sony.net, WIPO Case No. D2000-1074 (Nov. 
28, 2000). 
108 Samsung Networks Co. v. SuperVirtualOffice Corp., WIPO Case No. 
DVE2010-0001 (May 10, 2010). 
109 Hertz Sys., Inc. v. Jeff Park, WIPO Case No. D2007-1120 (Nov. 9, 
2007). 
460 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
(<nursefinder.com>110); the deletion of a space 
(<nbcuniversal.com>111); the deletion of a space and a letter 
(<unitedairline.com>112); the deletion of an apostrophe, a 
letter, and a space (<samclub.com>113); and the addition of a 
generic word or a geographic name inserted before or after 





                                                
 
 
110 Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417 
(July 5, 2007). 
111 NBC Universal, Inc. v. Junak Kwon, WIPO Case No. D2004-0764 (Dec. 
23, 2004). 
112 United Airlines, Inc. v. United Airline Dot.Com, WIPO Case No. 
D2002-0835 (Nov. 9, 2002). 
113 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. iContents, WIPO Case No. D2006-0226 (June 
20, 2006). 
114 Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Sin, Eonmok, WIPO Case No. D2000-1007 
(Nov. 16, 2000). 
115 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazoninsu Co., WIPO Case No. D2001-1275 
(Dec. 20, 2001). “119” is the Korean equivalent of “911” stateside, for 
emergency services. 
116 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Dec. 
20, 2001). 
117 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazonpic, WIPO Case No. D2002-0330 (July 22, 
2002). 
118 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Kim Yoon-Jo, WIPO Case No. D2003-0774 (Mar. 
2, 2004). 
119 Casio Keisanki Kabushiki Kaisha v. Jongchan Kim, WIPO Case No. 
D2003-0400 (July 15, 2003). 
120 Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Lee Wongi, WIPO Case No. D2004-0984 (Feb. 
22, 2005). 
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i.   RESPONDENT HAS “NO RIGHTS OR LEGITIMATE 
INTERESTS IN RESPECT OF THE DOMAIN NAME”  
 
Procedurally, the complainant has the ultimate 
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, each 
of the elements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy.124 But the 
requisite element relating to the respondent’s rights or 
legitimate interests in the domain name calls on matters that 
are “peculiarly within the knowledge of the Respondent” 
and imposes on the complainant “the [often] impossible task 
of proving the negative.”125 Thus, for purposes of paragraph 
4(a)(ii), panels have decided that the complainant satisfies its 
initial burden by making a prima facie case that the 
respondent lacks a right or interest in the domain name, 
upon which the burden shifts to the respondent to show that 
it has such a right or interest.126 One panel advised that a 
                                                                                                         
 
 
121 Hotel Ritz, Ltd. v. Kim Min-Kouk, WIPO Case No. D2004-0154 (June 
23, 2004). 
122 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Pimser Elecs. Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2009-1630 
(Feb. 16, 2010). 
123 Playboy Enters. Int’l, Inc. v. Sookwan Park, WIPO Case No. D2001-
0778 (Oct. 1, 2001). 
124 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013). 
125 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (quoting Belupo d.d. v. 
WACHEM d.o.o., WIPO Case No. D2004-0110 (Apr. 14, 2004)). 
126 Mobile’s Republic v. Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089 
(Apr. 23, 2014); Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung Trading 
Co, Ltd., Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17, 2011) (citing 
Clerical Medical Inv. Grp. Ltd v. Clericalmedical.com, WIPO Case No. 
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prima facie case is made if the complainant shows that “it 
has not granted any rights to the Respondent, that the 
Respondent has no links with the Complainant and that the 
disputed domain name is not the name of the 
Respondent.”127  
In practice, in a significant number of UDRP 
proceedings, the complainant makes a prima facie case in its 
complaint, and the respondent defaults.128 In these 
circumstances,129 the panel must independently determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the 
respondent’s right or legitimate interest. Paragraph 4(c) 
provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which the 
respondent may demonstrate “rights or legitimate interests 
to the domain name for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(ii): 
(i)   before any notice to you of the dispute, 
your use of, or demonstrable preparations 
to use, the domain name or a name 
corresponding to the domain name in 
connection with a bona fide offering of 
goods or services; or 
                                                                                                         
 
 
D2000-1228 (Nov. 28, 2000)); Educ. Testing Serv. v. Hackers Language 
Inst./David Cho, Ph.D., WIPO Case No. D2006-1089 (Nov. 27, 2006).   
127 Educ. Testing Serv., WIPO Case No. D2006-1089. See Jet Marques v. 
Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (May 26, 2006) (quoting 
Cassava Enters. Ltd. v. Victor Chandler Int’l Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2004-
0753 (Nov. 11, 2004)).  
128 See supra note 18.  
129 In the event of a default, the rules allow the panel to decide the 
dispute based on the complaint, “[i]n the absence of exceptional 
circumstances.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 5(e). The panel may “draw 
such inferences therefrom as it considers appropriate.” Id. ¶ 14(b). 
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(ii)   you (as an individual, business, or other 
organization) have been commonly known 
by the domain name, even if you have 
acquired no trademark or service mark 
rights; or 
(iii)  you are making a legitimate 
noncommercial or fair use of the domain 
name, without intent for commercial gain 
to misleadingly divert consumers or to 
tarnish the trademark or service mark at 
issue.130 
 
As discussed herein, where the respondent was successful in 
demonstrating a right or legitimate interest in the domain 
name, it has most frequently been under paragraph 4(c)(i). 
Most of the decisions that contain significant 
discussion of the respondent’s right or interest appear to fall 
in one of two categories. In the first, there is a prior 
relationship between the complainant and respondent before 
the dispute emerges. The second includes decisions that 
involve a domain name (identical or similar to the 
complainant’s mark) that the respondent contends is a 
generic or descriptive term to which it has a right to use on 
the Internet. These decisions are addressed in turn.  
In Topfield Co. v. Jai Kemp & Digital Products Group Pty 
Ltd.,131 the Korean complainant had registrations worldwide 
(including Australia) for the “TOPFIELD” mark, used for 
television set-top boxes and personal video recorders. The 
                                                
 
 
130 UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(c). 
131 WIPO Case No. DAU2008-0002 (Apr. 21, 2008). 
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complainant challenged the Australian respondent’s 
registration and use of the domain names <i-
topfield.com.au> and <topfield-australia.com.au>, which the 
respondent was using for its operations as a local distributor 
of the complainant. The parties disputed whether there was 
a termination of the distribution agreement. The panel 
proceeded on the basis that the distributorship was not 
terminated. It determined that the active websites for which 
the domain names were used “were consistent with the 
legitimate operations of a distributor of the Complainant’s 
products,” and thus, there was a bona fide offering of 
services under paragraph 4(c)(i).132  
There was also a relationship of sorts between the 
parties in Educational Testing Service v. Hackers Language 
Institute/David Cho, Ph.D.133 There, the complainant 
developed the Test of English for International 
Communication (TOEIC) and Test of English for Foreign 
Languages (TOEFL), well-known standardized tests for 
assessing English language proficiency, and especially 
familiar to students in Korea who desire to study in the 
United States. The complainant challenged the respondent’s 
registration of the domain names <hackerstoefl.com> and 
<hackstoeic.com>. The respondent claimed trademark rights 
of its own, from its registration in Korea of “HACKER’S”, 
used for studying methods for the TOEFL and TOEIC tests – 
                                                
 
 
132 Regarding the question of whether use by an authorized dealer or 
reseller is a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of 
paragraph 4(c)(i), the panel referred to the requirements offered in Oki 
Data Americas, Inc. v. ASD, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0903 (Nov. 6, 
2001). 
133 WIPO Case No. D2006-1089 (Nov. 27, 2006). 
2016 THE FIFTY-EIGHT PROCEEDINGS 465 
the “Hacker’s Program for the TOEFL Test” and the 
“Hacker’s Program for the TOEIC Test.”134 
The panel found that the respondent demonstrated a 
right or interest in the domain name under paragraph 4(c)(i), 
stating, “The Respondent has been operating the websites 
under the disputed domain names for a bona fide offering of 
goods and services before receiving notification regarding 
the dispute.”135 The panel also commented on the ongoing 
co-existence between the two parties, noting: “use of these 
domain names has apparently been tolerated by the 
Complainant”; and “the Complainant apparently still 
                                                
 
 
134 Id. The respondent’s argument that it could not offer preparation 
materials for the TOEFL or TOEIC test “without naming the 
Complainant’s marks,” id., reminds of the “nominative fair use” defense 
seen in U.S. trademark law. As Judge Kozinski explained,  
[W]here the defendant uses a trademark to describe the 
plaintiff’s product, rather than its own, we hold that a 
commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense 
provided he meets the following three requirements: First, the 
product or service in question must be one not readily 
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much 
of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to 
identify the product or service;[] and third, the user must do 
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. 
New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 
(9th Cir. 1992) (footnote and citation omitted). 
135 Educ. Testing Serv., WIPO Case No. D2006-1089. Without referring to 
paragraph 4(c)(ii), the panel also noted, “The Respondent is commonly 
known by the disputed domain names, as evidenced by the number of 
visitors to its websites and the amount of queries for ‘hackers toeic’ and 
‘hackers toefl’ in a well-known search engine in the Republic of Korea. 
Around 64 % of all TOEFL applicants in the Republic of Korea have 
utilized the ‘Hackers TOEFL’-program.” Id. 
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tolerates the use of its trademarks in combination with the 
Respondent’s trademark as part of the title of the books and 
programs which the Respondent has published.”136 
There is also a group of decisions in which the panel 
elaborated on the respondent’s right or interest in the 
domain name, where the respondent contended that the 
domain name was a generic or descriptive term. These 
decisions pit the holder of the following marks versus the 
party that registered the corresponding domain names: 
“NEWS REPUBLIC” v. <newsrepublic.com>;137 “JET 
TOURS” v. <jettour.com>;138 “MORNAY” v. 
<mornay.com>;139 “NURSEFINDERS” v. 
<nursefinder.com>;140 and “SHOULDERDOC.CO.UK” v. 
<shoulderdoc.co.uk>.141 
In the dispute over the domain name 
<newsrepublic.com>, the panel declared that the 
complainant failed to make even a prima facie case showing 
that the respondent lacked a right or legitimate interest.142 
But even if the panel were to accept that the complainant 
established a prima facie case, the panel continued, the 
                                                
 
 
136 Id.  
137 Mobile’s Republic v. Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089 
(Apr. 23, 2014). 
138 Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (May 
26, 2006). 
139 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008). 
140 Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417 
(July 5, 2007). 
141 Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0625 
(Sept. 8, 2006). 
142 Mobile’s Republic, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089.  
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respondent had submitted sufficient evidence to rebut it. 
The panel explained that “a respondent may have a right to 
register and use a domain name to attract Internet traffic 
based on the appeal of a commonly used descriptive term, 
even when the domain name is confusingly similar or 
identical to a complainant’s registered mark,” so long as that 
domain name is registered “because of its attraction as a 
dictionary word or combination of descriptive terms, and 
not because of any value corresponding to a trademark; the 
use of the domain name must also be consistent with its 
attraction as dictionary words or descriptive terms.”143 Here, 
the panel noted that there was a descriptive nature to the 
domain name, which incorporates “news” and “republic” 
(the latter term meaning, when used with another word, “a 
body of persons freely engaged in a specified activity”).144 
The panel found that the complainant’s use of the website 
“to gather in one place links to news sites is consistent with 
the ordinary meanings of the terms combined to form the 
disputed domain name.”145 Thus, the use of the domain 
name was a bona fide offering of goods or services under 
paragraph 4(c)(i) and confirmed the respondent’s right or 
interest in the domain name.146 
In the decisions involving <jettour.com>, 
<mornay.com>, <nursefinder.com>, and 
                                                
 
 
143 Id.  
144 Id. & n.3 (citing Merriam-Webster online dictionary). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. The panel also noted that the respondent had purchased the 
disputed domain name from a party that had previously used it for 
several years for “a website displaying news articles and links to other 
news services.” Id. 
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<shoulderdoc.co.uk>, the panel in each case, after discussing 
at length the question of whether the respondent had a right 
or interest in the domain name, declined to reach a finding 
on the matter, in light of the panel’s instructive 
determination regarding the bad faith element under 
paragraph 4(a)(iii).147 The panel in most of these decisions 
noted a connection between the second and third elements, 
specifically, that the question of whether the respondent had 
a right or interest depends on whether the respondent was 
aware of the complainant and its mark, which relates to 
                                                
 
 
147 Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (May 
26, 2006) (stating, “There are significant gaps in the evidence provided 
on this issue by both parties, and the Panel believes that it has 
insufficient information to make any reliable finding on it. . . . In the end, 
the Panel is clear in its view that the Complainant has failed to discharge 
its burden of proving bad faith under Paragraph 4(a)(iii), and it is 
therefore not necessary to reach a conclusion under Paragraph 4(a)(ii). 
Accordingly, we make no finding under paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy, 
and the Complaint falls to be decided under paragraph 4(a)(iii).”); IPGM 
Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, WIPO 
Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (stating, “The Panel finds that 
whether the second element of the Policy has been met is a fairly close 
question. . . . [T]he Panel has concluded that the third element of the 
Policy has not been met. Therefore, the Panel finds that it is not 
necessary to decide whether the second element has been met.”); 
Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417 (July 
5, 2007) (stating, “Because [the question of the respondent’s right or 
interest] goes to the heart of the Complainant’s bad-faith argument, it is 
addressed below in connection with the third UDRP element.”); 
Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0625 
(Sept. 8, 2006) (stating that “it is not necessary in the particular 
circumstances of this case to make a finding under paragraph 4(a)(ii).”). 
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whether it was acting in good faith (or bad faith).148 Or as the 
panel in the <nursefinder.com> decision wrote,  
[T]he Respondent’s use of the Domain Name 
would not be deemed to be in connection with 
a bona fide commercial offering if the evidence 
indicated that the Respondent selected generic 
words that were identical or confusingly 
similar to a trademark of which the Respondent 
was or should have been aware, with the likely 
effect of misleading Internet users as to the 
source of the website associated with the 
Domain Name. . . . Because that question goes 
to the heart of the Complainant’s bad-faith 
argument, it is addressed below in connection 
with the third UDRP element.149  
 
ii.   DOMAIN NAME “HAS BEEN REGISTERED AND IS BEING 
USED IN BAD FAITH” 
 
Paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy requires evidence that 
the domain name “has been registered and is being used in 
bad faith.”150 Paragraph 4(b) provides,  
For the purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(iii), 
the following circumstances, in particular but 
without limitation, if found by the Panel to be 
                                                
 
 
148 Nursefinders, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417; Shoulderdoc Ltd., WIPO 
Case No. D2006-0625; Jet Marques, WIPO Case No. D2006-0250. 
149 Nursefinders, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417 (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted).  
150 UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(a)(iii). 
470 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
present, shall be evidence of the registration 
and use of a domain name in bad faith: 
 
(i)   circumstances indicating that you have 
registered or you have acquired the 
domain name primarily for the purpose of 
selling, renting, or otherwise transferring 
the domain name registration to the 
complainant who is the owner of the 
trademark or service mark or to a 
competitor of that complainant, for 
valuable consideration in excess of your 
documented out-of-pocket costs directly 
related to the domain name; or 
(ii)   you have registered the domain name in 
order to prevent the owner of the 
trademark or service mark from reflecting 
the mark in a corresponding domain 
name, provided that you have engaged in 
a pattern of such conduct; or 
(iii)  you have registered the domain name 
primarily for the purpose of disrupting the 
business of a competitor; or 
(iv)  by using the domain name, you have 
intentionally attempted to attract, for 
commercial gain, Internet users to your 
web site or other on-line location, by 
creating a likelihood of confusion with the 
complainant's mark as to the source, 
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of 
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your web site or location or of a product or 
service on your web site or location.151 
 
An aside here. Precisely what is required to satisfy the 
bad faith element under paragraph 4 of the Policy has been a 
subject of much discussion by UDRP panels. Some panelists, 
emphasizing the “conjunctive” phrasing of paragraph 
4(a)(iii) (“registered and is being used”), have declared that 
the provision requires both bad faith registration and bad 
faith use.152 Therefore, under this approach, if either bad 
faith registration or bad faith use is absent, then this 
requisite element is not met, and the complaint must be 
denied.153 But other panelists emphasize the prefatory 
language of paragraph 4(b) (“For the purposes of Paragraph 
4(a)(iii), the following circumstances . . . shall be evidence of 
the registration and use . . . in bad faith”) to conclude that 
evidence demonstrating the presence of any of the four non-
                                                
 
 
151 Id. ¶ 4(b). 
152 E.g., Strongarm Designs, Inc. v. Arisu Tech, WIPO Case No. D2001-
0776 (Sept. 17, 2001). See Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung 
Trading Co, Ltd., Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17, 
2011) (stating that “the Complainant must prove that both registration 
and use of the disputed domain name are in bad faith”); VoiceStream 
Wireless Corp. v. Hanjin Ko, WIPO Case No. D2001-1411 (Mar. 25, 2002) 
(referring to “twin requirements of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy”).  
153 E.g., Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 
(May 20, 2009). Or put another way, if either bad faith registration or bad 
faith use is absent, then it is dispositive, and it is not necessary for the 
panel to address the other. IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe 
Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) 
(noting absence of bad faith registration, which was dispositive); 
Protosoftware, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0905 
(Oct. 10, 2006) (same). 
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exhaustive examples (incidentally, three of which refer to 
registration and one to use) is sufficient to satisfy the 
requisite element in paragraph 4(a)(iii).154 Some panelists 
ultimately place themselves in the latter camp, when they 
                                                
 
 
154 Panelist Sally M. Abel addressed this point in a decision outside of the 
58 decisions herein, in which she stated: 
The Policy speaks for itself. While Paragraph 4(a)(iii) of 
the Policy requires that the Complainant prove that the 
‘domain name has been registered and is being used in 
bad faith,’ that requirement is further illuminated by the 
language of Paragraph 4(b) addressing ‘Evidence of 
Registration and Use in Bad Faith’. Paragraph 4(b) 
expressly delineates four, each free-standing, examples 
of what a panel may find to be ‘evidence of the 
registration and use of a domain name in bad faith’ but 
first underscores that these examples are not the 
exclusive basis for finding registration and use in bad 
faith . . . . Thus the Policy contemplates that the 
circumstances of bad faith registration and use 
presented in particular cases will not necessarily fall 
neatly into one or more of the four examples contained 
in the Policy, but are helpful guideposts for panels 
considering unique sets of facts as to the type of 
behavior the Policy is intended to address.  
Dean Hill Sys. Ltd. v. Gregory Santana, WIPO Case No. D2002-0404 
(Sept. 20, 2002) (citing American Mensa, Ltd. v. Millennium Energy 
Niche Studies Associative, WIPO Case No. D2000-1030 (Jan. 26, 2001)) 
(Abel, Pan., concurring).  
Within the 58 decisions, some panels have found bad faith 
registration and use under paragraph 4(a)(iii) based on one example 
provided in paragraph 4(b). E.g., Deutsche Lufthansa AG v. [] 
Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2013-1844 (Jan. 22, 2014); Minka 
Lighting, Inc. v. Lee Wongi, WIPO Case No. D2004-0984 (Feb. 22, 2005) 
(finding bad faith in paragraph 4(b)(iv)); NHN Corp. v. NHN Corp., 
WIPO Case No. D2003-0939 (Feb. 27, 2004) (paragraph 4(b)(i)). 
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begin with the statement that paragraph 4(a)(iii)’s 
“requirement is conjunctive, and therefore the Complainant 
must establish both bad faith registration and bad faith use,” 
but then add, “For purposes of the Policy, a finding of any of 
the circumstances listed in Paragraph 4(b) will be sufficient 
to establish registration and use in bad faith.”155 The debate 
over the interpretation of paragraph 4(a)(iii) continues for 
UDRP panelists, and has seen lively and innovative 
arguments.156 The split is not addressed directly in WIPO’s 
                                                
 
 
155 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Kim Yoon-Jo, WIPO Case No. D2003-0774 (Mar. 
2, 2004) (citations omitted). See Esquire Innovations, Inc. v. [] Vertical 
Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0856 (Oct. 5, 2007). 
156 Panelist Tony Willoughby offered a comprehensive discussion of the 
matter in Camon S.p.A. v. Intelli-Pet, LLC, WIPO Case No. D2009-1716 
(Mar. 12, 2010). There, he discussed, among much more, the significance 
in the phrasing of the prefatory language in paragraph 4(b) (“the 
following circumstances . . . shall be evidence of the registration and use of 
a domain name in bad faith”) (emphasis added) in contrast to that of 
paragraph 4(c) (“the following circumstances . . . shall demonstrate your 
rights or legitimate interests to the domain name”) (emphasis added). 
Another decision of interest is Guru Denim Inc. v. Ibrahim Ali Ibrahim Abu-
Harb, WIPO Case No. D2013-1324 (Sept. 27, 2013), where the majority of 
the panel, in denying the complaint due to the absence of bad faith 
registration, began the discussion regarding the bad faith element:  
There are broadly two views of the interpretation of the 
requirements for bad faith under the third element of the 
Policy, namely the “unitary” and the “conjunctive” 
views. . . . Suffice it to say here that the majority 
subscribes to the “conjunctive” view or in other words 
that the plain literal meaning of the third element of the 
Policy is that both registration and use in bad faith must 
be found individually before the requirements of that 
element are fulfilled. 
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overview of panel decisions on common issues, and no 
consensus view is identified.157 In all events, the 58 decisions 
herein include examples of both approaches to the 
application and interpretation of paragraph 4(a)(iii) (and 
4(b)).158 
                                                                                                         
 
 
Id. The dissenting panelist disagreed that “the plain literal meaning of 
the third element” required a finding of both registration and use in bad 
faith individually, and also urged, 
The majority sets up a dispute that does not exist 
between the majority and minority view. The minority 
view has never contended that one need only prove bad 
faith registration or bad faith use. That would be a 
conflict between a conjunctive and disjunctive view, a 
view which the minority has never held. Rather the 
dispute is that the majority treats bad faith registration 
and use as a binary concept. One must separately prove 
bad faith registration, th[e]n separately prove bad faith 
use. Under the majority view one must prove one plus 
one. The minority view treats bad faith registration and 
use as a unitary concept. One is required to prove that 
under all the facts and circumstances that the 
respondent is acting in bad faith by intending to profit 
from the good will developed in the complainant’s 
trademark. There is no arithmetical calculation required. 
Id. (Donahey, Pan., dissenting). The decision has received attention in 
recent cases. Cyberlaw, supra note 34, at 2130 (noting, “it is important to 
supplement the majority opinion with a robust policy defense”). 
157 See WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 26. 
158 Compare Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung Trading Co, 
Ltd., Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17, 2011) (requiring 
proof of “both registration and use of the disputed domain name are in 
bad faith”) with Esquire Innovations, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0856 
(stating “any one” of four circumstances in Paragraph 4(b) of Policy 
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There is universal agreement that bad faith on the 
part of the respondent for purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) 
presumes that the respondent was aware of the complainant, 
the owner of a protected mark.159 The examples provided in 
paragraph 4(b) support this point. The respondent is 
presumed to have knowledge of the owner of the mark (i) to 
whom it intends to sell the domain name, (ii) to prevent the 
owner from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain 
name, (iii) to disrupt the business of the owner, a competitor, 
or (iv) to attract Internet users by creating a likelihood of 
confusion with the owner’s mark.  
One question that arises in this context is whether the 
doctrine of constructive notice seen in U.S. trademark law is 
adopted in UDRP proceedings. The Lanham Act provides: 
“Registration of a mark on the principal register . . . shall be 
constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership 
thereof.”160 But UDRP panels “have generally declined to 
adopt the United States doctrine of constructive notice to the 
bad faith requirement.”161 Thus, there must be evidence that 
the “domain name registrant was actually aware of the 
complainant and its mark and selected the domain name to 
take some advantage of the mark and any good will attached 
                                                                                                         
 
 
“shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad 
faith”).  
159 HSM Argentina S.A. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017 
(May 1, 2007); Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. 
D2006-0625 (Sept. 8, 2006); Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case 
No. D2006-0250 (May 26, 2006). 
160 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2016). 
161 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013). 
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to it,”162 or “facts that might support an inference of 
knowledge.”163 
Turning to the decisions where the panel found the 
bad faith element to be satisfied,164 the most common basis is 
the respondent’s attempt to attract Internet users to its 
website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the 
complainant’s mark, under paragraph 4(b)(iv).165 This is 
frequently seen in cases where the disputed domain name 
resolves to a website whose content includes text or links 
relating to the complainant’s services or products,166 its 




163 Id. As another observed, “Rarely, if ever, will there be direct proof that 
a respondent was fully aware of a complainant’s trademark rights and 
intentionally registered a disputed domain name in bad faith. And so it 
is not surprising that a respondent may assert ignorance of a 
complainant’s trademark rights. Accordingly, a panel must always look 
to the circumstantial evidence in making this determination.” Deutsche 
Telekom AG v. Unitedeurope Consulting, WIPO Case No. D2006-0930 
(Dec. 27, 2006). 
164 Panels often identify which of the four examples in paragraph 4(b) are 
present. In some decisions, a finding of bad faith is based on multiple 
examples provided in paragraph 4(b). Esquire Innovations, Inc., WIPO 
Case No. D2007-0856 (finding bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(i), (ii), & 
(iv)); Chivas Bros. Ltd. v. Anyweb Co., WIPO Case No. D2006-1446 (Feb. 
2, 2007) (same); Groupe Canal+ Co. v. Jinsoo Yoon, WIPO Case No. 
D2006-1240 (Dec. 26, 2006) (same); Carfax, Inc. v. COMn.COM, WIPO 
Case No. D2002-0513 (Sept. 18, 2002) (same). 
165 E.g., Deutsche Lufthansa AG v. [] Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. 
D2013-1844 (Jan. 22, 2014); Hertz Sys., Inc. v. Jeff Park, WIPO Case No. 
D2007-1120 (Nov. 9, 2007); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazonpic, WIPO Case 
No. D2002-0330 (July 22, 2002) (2-1 decision). 
166 E.g., Knowland Grp. v. Trademark Mgmts., WIPO Case No. D2011-
1005 (Aug. 26, 2011) (noting respondent’s “website . . . contained a 
number of links to goods and services related to the software and 
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competitors, or sometimes more brazenly, the complainant 
directly.167 Illustrative is Tokyu Corp. v. Jeongyong Cho, where 
the complainant, Tokyu Group, “one of the leading 
enterprise groups in Japan,” operated “a wide variety of 
hotel businesses, and [was] expanding in the various forms 
of hotels, as symbolized by the opening of new ‘The Capitol 
Hotel Tokyu.’”168 The respondent registered the domain 
name <capitoltokyu.com>, which resolved to a website that 
featured hotels in Japan.169 The panel concluded that the 
respondent intended to cause confusion with respect to the 
source of the products or services in the website, “as well as 
the sponsorship and capital or business tie-up with the 
Complainant and the Tokyu Group, leading customers to 
believe that the Respondent is affiliated with the 
Complain[an]t, and gaining commercial profits by using the 
Domain Name.”170  
                                                                                                         
 
 
business solution, in connection with which the Complainant has 
consistently used the KNOWLAND Mark since 2004.”); Casio Keisanki 
Kabushiki Kaisha v. Jongchan Kim, WIPO Case No. D2003-0400 (July 15, 
2003) (stating, “Respondent, by using the disputed domain name to lead 
to a website promoting, for commercial gain, goods identical with the 
designated goods of the Complainant’s trademark, has intentionally 
sought to confuse internet users as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation 
or endorsement of his website.”).  
167 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Kim Yoon-Jo, WIPO Case No. D2003-0774 (Mar. 
2, 2004) (stating, “Respondent’s bad faith registration and use of the 
<amazonfire.com> domain name can be inferred from Respondent’s 
inclusion of the entire AMAZON.COM trademark in the 
<amazonfire.com> Domain Name . . . .”). 
168 WIPO Case No. D2008-1407 (Dec. 28, 2008). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
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Bad faith is also frequently found when the 
respondent attempts to sell the domain name to the 
complainant or the complainant’s competitor at a high(er) 
price, under paragraph 4(b)(i)), an example of classic 
cybersquatting. For example, in Playboy Enterprises 
International, Inc. v. Sookwan Park,171 the Korean respondent 
registered the domain name <playboysportsbooks.com> 
days after the complainant announced its intention to 
operate an online sports wagering site at 
<playboysportsbook.com>. According to the complainant, 
the respondent then contacted the complainant and 
requested a payment of $1,000 for the transfer of the domain 
name. The panel found that this was an offer to sell the 
domain name for an amount in excess of out-of-pocket 
expenses, under paragraph 4(b)(i).172   
A finding of bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(ii), 
wherein the respondent is found to have engaged in a 
pattern of registering domain names in order to prevent the 
owner of the mark “from reflecting the mark in a 
corresponding domain name,” is less frequent in the UDRP 
resolutions. Among the 58 decisions herein, the only 
decision in which this element was the sole basis for a 
finding of bad faith is Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Sin, Eonmok, 
which involved the domain name <mysony.com>.173 The 
panel found that in addition to this domain name, the 
respondent had previously registered numerous other 
domain names that incorporated the complainant’s “SONY” 
                                                
 
 
171 WIPO Case No. D2001-0778 (Oct. 1, 2001). 
172 Id. 
173 WIPO Case No. D2000-1007 (Nov. 16, 2000). 
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mark, all without the complainant’s authorization.174 Bad 
faith may also be found under paragraph 4(b)(iii), where the 
respondent registered the domain name “primarily for the 
purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor.”175 There 
is no decision from the 58 decisions in which bad faith was 
found under this provision alone.176    
As noted above, the list of circumstances indicating 
bad faith in paragraph 4(b) is not exhaustive. Panels have 
relied on other factors to satisfy the bad faith element. For 
example, in a decision involving the disputed domain name 
<sony.net>,177 the panel initially concluded that there was no 
evidence to support any of the criteria set out in paragraph 
4(b). Emphasizing that the provision’s list is non-exhaustive, 
the panel stated, 
The Domain Name can only sensibly refer to 
the Complainant, there is no obvious possible 
justification for the Respondent’s selection of 
                                                
 
 
174 These domain names included: <calsony.com>; <hotsony.com>; 
<mildsony.com>; <onytour.com>; <sonycall.com>; <sonyfashion.com>; 
<sonyfund.com>; <sonym.com>; <sonymild.com>; <sonymotors.com>; 
<sonyms.com>; <sonyn.com>; <sonypresents.com>; <sonyshow.com>; 
<sonystock.com>; <sonystocks.com>; <sony7.com>; <sony77.com>; 
<sony777.com>; <sunsony.com>. The panel also noted that the 
respondent registered over other 2,000 domain names, incorporating 
well-known trademarks such as “HYUNDAI”, “LPGA”, “NASDAQ”, 
“NFL”, and “SAMSUNG”. Id.      
175 UDRP, supra note 5, ¶ 4(b)(iii). 
176 But examples involving non-Korean parties are available. E.g., 
Diebold, Inc. v. Paul Terwilliger, WIPO Case No. D2003-0416 (July 15, 
2003); Carpetright PLC v. Carpets Direct, WIPO Case No. D2001-0287 
(Apr. 26, 2001). 
177 Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. sony.net, WIPO Case No. D2000-1074 (Nov. 
28, 2000). 
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the Domain Name, the Respondent has not 
sought to put before the Panel any justification 
for its selection of the Domain Name and it is 
difficult to conceive of any use of the Domain 
Name, which will not be likely to cause 
confusion of some kind. In the Panel’s view the 
threat that such use may be made of the 
Domain Name constitutes use in bad faith.178 
                                                
 
 
178 Id. The decisions also include discussion of other circumstances that 
may constitute bad faith for purposes of paragraph 4 of the Policy, and 
the views therein indicate the range of discretion that a panel may 
exercise in its findings. One panel declared that the respondent’s use of a 
privacy service to shield its identity was not “evidence in itself of bad 
faith.” Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO 
Case No. D2007-0795 (Oct. 12, 2007). But another stated that the 
respondent’s “attempts to conceal its true identity are further evidence of 
its bad faith.” United Airlines, Inc. v. United Airline Dot.Com, WIPO 
Case No. D2002-0835 (Nov. 9, 2002).The panel in Bright Horizons Family 
Solutions Inc. denied the complaint; in United Airlines, Inc., the panel 
ordered the transfer of the domain name. 
The respondent’s failure to reply to the complainant’s cease and 
desist letter “may in some circumstances be relevant to” registration and 
use in bad faith. Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc., WIPO Case No. 
D2007-0795.  “For example, it could undermine the credibility of an 
explanation proffered at a later stage which one might have expected to 
have been given earlier, if true.” Id. Ultimately, the panel in Bright 
Horizons Family Solutions Inc. determined that the respondent’s failure to 
reply was not a sufficient ground for a finding of bad faith. In another 
decision, the respondent transferred the domain name to a Korean 
language registrar after the respondent became aware of the 
complainant, in an apparent attempt to change the language of the 
proceeding from English to Korean. The panel described such conduct as 
“improper” and “suggestive of bad faith with regard to the conduct of 
these proceedings,” but “not sufficient by itself, to show that the Domain 




B.   A MINORITY OF DECISIONS: COMPLAINT IS DENIED, 
RESPONDENT KEEPS THE DOMAIN NAME (AND SOMETIMES 
GETS FINDING OF COMPLAINANT BAD FAITH)  
 
Of the 58 decisions that are included in this study, the 
panel denied the complaint in twenty-one of them, thus 
allowing the respondents to keep twenty-nine of the eighty-
one subject domain names,179 for a rate of over 35%.180 This 
percentage (albeit taken from a small sample) is significantly 
higher than that seen in WIPO-administered UDRP 
decisions overall – less than 13%.181 Under paragraph 4(a) of 
the Policy, the panel must deny the complainant’s request 
for relief when any of the three elements of paragraph 4(a) is 
not established.182 The previous discussion referred to some 
                                                                                                         
 
 
Name was registered in bad faith.” IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du 
Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 
2008). 
179 Some decisions involved more than one domain name; the complaint 
was denied with respect to some names, but not in others. See Appendix. 
180 The rate of decisions in favor of the respondent for all WIPO-
administered decisions involving Korean parties (whether decided by a 
sole or three-member panels) is 10.1%. See Lee, supra note 18, at 310.  
181 See WIPO Case Outcomes, supra note 12. 
182 In some of the twenty-one proceedings, the panel based its decision 
on the absence of one of the elements, stating that it was unnecessary to 
decide one or both of the other elements. E.g., UTV Ltd. v. Unitedeurope 
Consulting, Kwang Pyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2011-2293 (Mar. 5, 2012) 
(stating unnecessary to decide paragraph 4(a)(iii), in light of dispositive 
decision on paragraph 4(a)(ii)); Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, 
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of the decisions in which the complaint was denied due to 
the complainant’s failure to establish rights in it purported 
mark (paragraph 4(a)(i)) or failure to show that the 
respondent lacked a right or interest in the domain name 
(paragraph 4(a)(ii)).183 In most of the decisions in which the 
complaint was denied, thus allowing the respondent to keep 
the domain name, the lack of the bad faith element proved 
fatal for the complainant. This section discusses the 
illustrative bad faith decisions, and the common reasons for 
the denial of the complaint under paragraph 4(a)(iii). 
 One example of a case that lacks bad faith is where 
the disputed domain name is registered before the 
complainant obtains rights in a mark. In such an instance, 
the respondent could not have been aware of the 
complainant’s mark, or have an intent to capitalize on it. 
Thus, in Protosoftware, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc.,184 where the 
respondent registered the domain name <proto.com> three 
years before the complainant registered the “PROTO” mark, 
and four years before it first used this mark in commerce, the 
panel found the bad faith element missing and denied the 
complaint. The same result occurred in Deutsche Telekom AG 
v. Unitedeurope Consulting, where the panel found that the 
                                                                                                         
 
 
WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 (May 20, 2009) (stating unnecessary to 
decide paragraph 4(a)(ii), in light of dispositive decision on paragraph 
4(a)(iii)); Protosoftware, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-
0905 (Oct. 10, 2006) (stating unnecessary to decide paragraph 4(a)(i) or 
(ii), in light of dispositive decision on paragraph 4(a)(iii)).  
183 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay, WIPO Case No. 
D2007-1513. 
184 WIPO Case No. D2006-0905. 
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respondent registered the domain names <t-health.com>, <t-
portal.com>, and <t-sales.com>, before the complainant filed 
applications for registration of its corresponding trademarks, 
“T-HEALTH”, “T-PORTAL”, and “T-SALES”.185 
Nearly half of the 58 decisions in which the complaint 
was denied, and almost all of the decisions where the lack of 
the bad faith element was dispositive, involve a domain 
name that the respondent urged was generic or descriptive 
in nature: <allegretto.com>,186 <brighthorizon.com>,187 
<jettour.com>,188 <mornay.com> (“meaning a white 
sauce”),189 <neodent.com>,190 <newsrepublic.com>,191 
<nursefinder.com>,192 and <shoulderdoc.com>.193 From 
these decisions, common themes emerge relating to whether 
the respondent was aware of the complainant or its mark at 
the time the respondent registered the domain name. 
Specifically, the panel noted that the complainant’s mark 
                                                
 
 
185 WIPO Case No. D2006-0930 (Dec. 27, 2006). 
186 Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung Trading Co, Ltd., 
Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17, 2011). 
187 Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO 
Case No. D2007-0795 (Oct. 12, 2007). 
188 Jet Marques v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (May 
26, 2006). 
189 IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008). 
190 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013). 
191 Mobile’s Republic v. Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089 
(Apr. 23, 2014). 
192 Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417 
(July 5, 2007). 
193 Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0625 
(Sept. 8, 2006). 
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was not particularly distinctive or well-known or had wide 
reputation;194 the complainant’s rights in the mark was 
limited to its own country or nearby region, and did not 
extend to the respondent’s Korea;195 and the respondent had 
a plausible reason for registering the domain name.196  
                                                
 
 
194 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A., WIPO Case No. 
D2013-1838 (stating, “[T]he Panel finds that the Complainant’s marks are 
not fanciful and not marks known widely as unique to its owner (such as 
YAHOO or EXXON) but rather an obvious abbreviation for ‘New dental’ 
in English.”); IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay, WIPO 
Case No. D2007-1513 (stating, “Complainant is not so famous, nor is its 
MORNAY mark so arbitrary, that the Panel can in the circumstances of 
this case assume knowledge of Complainant’s name and mark.”); Bright 
Horizons Family Solutions Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. 
D2007-0795 (Oct. 12, 2007) (stating, “The Complainants have provided 
no evidence of the nature or extent of their reputation under the mark . . 
.”); Nursefinders, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0417 (stating that “the mark 
is inherently descriptive, being comprised of common English words”); 
Shoulderdoc Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2006-0625 (referring to mark’s 
“relative lack of distinctiveness” and “descriptive nature”); Jet Marques 
v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (May 26, 2006) (stating 
that “there is no evidence of the reputation of the mark extending to 
[Korea]” and “[t]he mark may be well known to professionals in the 
travel industry in countries outside Europe, but there is no evidence that 
the Respondent falls into that category.”).  
195 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A., WIPO Case No. 
D2013-1838 (stating, “The Complainant provides no evidence that the 
Respondent, who does business only in the Republic of Korea, knew of 
the Complainant or its NEODENT marks when the Respondent 
registered the disputed domain name . . . .”); Nursefinders, Inc., WIPO 
Case No. D2007-0417 (stating that “the Complainant’s mark has 
demonstrably acquired a distinctive secondary meaning only in the 
United States where there Respondent is not located”); Jet Marques, 
WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (stating, “The mark is registered only in 
Europe. The Respondent appears to be a domain name professional 
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An illustrative decision incorporating these points is 
seen in the proceeding involving the domain name 
<allegretto.com>.197 There, the complainant, a German coffee 
roaster, commenced a UDRP proceeding against a Korean 
manufacturer of “underwear, garments, baby garments,” 
and other products.198 The respondent argued that it had 
never heard of the complainant or its trademark 
“ALLEGRETTO” before the dispute, and that the term is a 
common dictionary word meaning “fairly quickly or 
briskly,” which the respondent learned when in middle 
school.199 The panel agreed with the respondent’s 
characterization of the domain name as a “‘dictionary’ term” 
and that “‘allegretto’ is not the kind of word/trademark that 
can be said to be obviously related to one specific company 
or goods/services.”200 The panel also noted that at the time 
                                                                                                         
 
 
based in the Republic of Korea, and possibly with business interests in 
the United States. There is no evidence of the Respondent carrying on 
business in Europe, and no other reason to conclude that the 
Respondent’s residence or place of business would, in the ordinary 
course of things, have made it aware of the mark.”). 
196 Jet Marques, WIPO Case No. D2006-0250 (stating that “it is therefore 
plausible that the Respondent may have chosen the Domain Name for no 
better reason than that it was a relatively short, common word English 
expression which had recently become available and was thought to 
have some value.”). 
197 Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung Trading Co, Ltd., 
Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17, 2011). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. In assessing whether the complainant’s mark is famous, well-
known, arbitrary, or distinctive, the panel may resort to Internet search 
engines. IPGM Inst. Mixte de Prévoyance du Groupe Mornay v. Sooyong 
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of the domain name’s registration, the complainant had only 
German trademarks, and that there was no evidence that the 
mark was well-known outside of Deutschland. In these 
circumstances, where “the respondent has a good faith belief 
that the domain name’s value derives from its generic or 
descriptive qualities, rather than its specific trademark 
value, the use of the domain name consistent with such good 
faith belief may be considered use in good faith.”201 
                                                                                                         
 
 
Kim, WIPO Case No. D2007-1513 (Mar. 4, 2008) (stating, “When the 
Panel recently conducted a search for MORNAY on ‘www.google.com’ 
or ‘www.google.co.kr’ from the United States of America[], there was no 
reference to Complainant in the first ten pages of results.”).  
201 Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (citing 
Mobile Commc’n Serv. Inc. v. WebReg, RN, WIPO Case No. D2005-1304 
(Feb. 24, 2006); Media Gen. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Rarenames, WebReg, 
WIPO Case No. D2006-0964 (Sept. 23, 2006)). In the Heimbs Kaffee GmbH 
& Co. KG decision, there appears a description of the respondent’s action 
four days after the complainant filed the complaint,  
The Panel notes that the Respondent filed the Korean 
national trademark application for ALLEGRETTO (fig) 
in Class 35 on August 23, 2011, the same day as the 
Respondent also transferred <allegretto.com> to a new 
Registrar. The Panel cannot draw any other conclusion 
than these actions, initiated after the date of the filing of 
the Complaint, were not basically done as a result of the 
Respondent[’]s serious business activities but rather 
indicating a goal to make a dispute resolution case more 
difficult to handle for the Complainant (in particular 
related to the language of the proceedings). 
Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407. The above 
discussion precedes the panel’s finding that the respondent had no right 
or legitimate interest in the domain name. The panel did not address it in 
the context of the respondent’s bad faith. Instead, the panel found that 
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For many of the same reasons seen in the cases 
involving a generic or descriptive term or phrase discussed 
above, panels have found that bad faith was not established 
in cases involving a domain name with two or three letter 
acronyms or abbreviations: <hsm.com>202 and <rb.net>.203 In 
both cases, the panel found that the complainant satisfied 
the requirement under paragraph 4(a)(i) that it had rights 
(through use, registration, or both) in the mark to which the 
domain name was identical or confusingly similar: “HSM” 
(along with “HSMONLINE”, “HSMEDUCATION”, and 
“HSM MANAGEMENTV”) for services “in the field of 
executive education”;204 and “RB” (the two letters resulting 
from “the merger of the UK Company Reckitt & Colman plc 
and the Dutch group Benckiser N.V.”205) for “commercial 
activities in the household, health care and personal care 
sectors.”206 (The complaint in a third case, involving the 
domain name <utv.com> and the corresponding mark 
“UTV” (originating from Ulster Television) for “television 
and radio broadcasting services and entertainment,” among 
others, was denied not under the bad faith element, but due 
                                                                                                         
 
 
the complainant failed to prove both bad faith registration and bad faith 
use, and denied the complaint. 
202 HSM Argentina S.A. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017 
(May 1, 2007). 
203 Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 
(May 20, 2009). 
204 HSM Argentina S.A., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017. 
205 Reckitt Benckiser Plc, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 (emphasis added). 
206 Id. 
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to the respondent’s right or legitimate interest in the domain 
name.207) 
In all three of the decisions, the panel determined that 
there was no evidence to show that the respondent was 
aware of the complainant at the time of the domain name 
registration,208 and noted the related points of the 
complainant’s weak or unknown mark,209 the geographic 
                                                
 
 
207 UTV Ltd. v. Unitedeurope Consulting, Kwang Pyo Kim, WIPO Case 
No. D2011-2293 (Mar. 5, 2012). 
208 Id.; Reckitt Benckiser Plc, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239; HSM Argentina 
S.A., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017. 
209 UTV Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2011-2293 (stating, “The Panel did, 
however, not find any evidence in support of the Complainant’s 
allegations of the Trademark’s strong reputation . . . .”; “[t]he disputed 
domain name typically is such a short term which may represent many 
acronyms.”; and “the disputed domain name is merely a generic short 
acronym in which the Respondent has a legitimate interest to use.”); 
Reckitt Benckiser Plc, WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 (stating, “‘RB’ has, as 
most other two-letter-acronyms, various meanings and is not only 
referring to the Complainant.”; “proof has not been established that the 
Complainant itself, as a company, is well-known under the acronym ‘RB’ 
(the website at ‘http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RB’, providing 
information on different meanings of ‘RB’, does not mention the 
Complainant).”); HSM Argentina S.A., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017 
(stating, “This evidence suggests that the combination of the letters ‘hsm’ 
may have a number of potential associations, unconnected with the 
Complainant.”; “the Panel stops short of finding that the Complainant or 
its marks are famous. The Complainant appears to be well-known in its 
field. But that field (‘executive education’) appears specific and defined. 
The Panel does not make the finding that the Complainant was, when 
the disputed domain name was registered, so generally well-known that 
the Respondent must have been aware of it.”). 
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separation of the complainant from Korea,210 and a plausible 
reason for the respondent registering the domain name.211 
In a UDRP proceeding, the successful complainant 
receives a panel decision directing cancellation of the 
disputed domain name or its transfer to the complainant. 
For the respondent, a denial of the complaint is the only 
result in its favor. In certain circumstances, however, the 
panel may issue a further vindication of the respondent and 
an affirmative rebuke against the complainant. “Reverse 
domain name hijacking” is defined under the UDRP Rules 
                                                
 
 
210 UTV Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2011-2293 (stating, “This could have been 
different if the Complainant’s claim that that the Trademark has a strong 
reputation and is widely known outside the (Northern) Ireland region, 
and – as the Complainant implied – more particularly in Republic of 
Korea where the Respondent is located . . . is true, as in such case the 
Respondent would have registered and used the disputed domain name 
with the actual knowledge of the Trademark and may have been using 
the disputed domain name in bad faith.”; “the Panel is of the opinion 
that the Respondent who is located in Republic of Korea cannot 
reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the Trademark which has 
only been used in United Kingdom and Ireland.”); Reckitt Benckiser Plc, 
WIPO Case No. D2009-0239 (stating, “The Complainant has neither 
demonstrated business activities in the Republic of Korea in the year 
2000, when the disputed domain name was registered, nor contended 
that it was well known in the Republic of Korea then . . . .”); HSM 
Argentina S.A., WIPO Case No. D2007-0017 (stating, “[T]he Respondent 
is resident in the Republic of Korea, while the Complainant is based in 
Argentina and its marks are registered principally in the Americas and 
the EU. The Complainant did not provide evidence of operating or 
having registered marks in the Republic of Korea.”). 
211 UTV Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2011-2293 (stating, “The disputed domain 
name typically is such a short term which may represent many 
acronyms.”; “the disputed domain name is merely a generic short 
acronym in which the Respondent has a legitimate interest to use.”). 
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as “using the Policy in bad faith to attempt to deprive a 
registered domain-name holder of a domain name.”212 
Another provision of the rules elaborates on the panel’s 
authority to make a finding of reverse domain name 
hijacking (and re-emphasizes the bad faith component):  
If after considering the submissions the Panel 
finds that the complaint was brought in bad 
faith, for example in an attempt at Reverse 
Domain Name Hijacking or was brought 
primarily to harass the domain-name holder, 
the Panel shall declare in its decision that the 
complaint was brought in bad faith and 
constitutes an abuse of the administrative 
proceeding.213 
 
In contrast to bad faith on the part of the respondent 
under paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, with non-exhaustive 
examples provided in paragraph 4(b), neither the Policy nor 
the UDRP Rules offer any further guidance on the 
                                                
 
 
212 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 1. 
213 Id. ¶ 15(e). Perhaps the respondent’s request for a finding of reverse 
domain name hijacking in a UDRP proceeding is the closest equivalent 
to the defendant’s counterclaim in a civil action. One panel noted that 
the respondent has the burden of proving bad faith in the filing of the 
complaint. Protosoftware, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. 
D2006-0905 (Oct. 10, 2006). If reverse domain name hijacking is a 
sanction against the complainant, it is a symbolic one. Another panel 
stated, “As the Rules do not provide for monetary remedies or specific 
relief in such a case [as described in paragraph 15(e)], a finding of 
reverse domain name hijacking would be of limited value to the 
Respondent.” Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. 
D2007-0417 (July 5, 2007). 
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complainant’s bad faith in bringing a complaint for purposes 
of a reverse domain name hijacking determination. Panels 
have stated that a finding of reverse domain name hijacking 
is warranted when “the complainant in fact knew or clearly 
should have known at the time that it filed the complaint 
that it could not prove one of the essential elements required 
by the UDRP,”214 or when “the face of the complaint itself 
demonstrates a settled reason why the complaint must be 
denied.”215 But a “mere lack of success of the Complaint is 
not of itself sufficient.”216 The determination of reverse 
domain name hijacking “is always within the panel’s 
discretion,” and even where the facts may justify such a 
finding, the panel may choose instead “to leave the parties 
as it found them.”217 Of the twenty-one decisions herein in 
                                                
 
 
214 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013) (quoting WIPO Overview 2.0, 
supra note 26, ¶ 4.17). See Witmer Pub. Safety Grp. Inc. v. Kwang pyo 
Kim, WIPO Case No. D2011-0075 (Mar. 31, 2011) (“[O]ne who brings a 
complaint, knowing that it will not be able to prove one or more of the 
elements set out in the Policy or recklessly indifferent as to whether it 
will be able to prove its case or not, runs a very real risk of . . . a finding 
[of reverse domain name hijacking] being made against it.”) (Brown, 
Pan., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
215 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A., WIPO Case No. 
D2013-1838 (citing Mile, Inc. v. Michael Burg, WIPO Case No. D2010-
2011 (Feb. 7, 2011); Liquid Nutrition Inc. v. liquidnutrition.com/Vertical 
Axis Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-1598 (Jan. 28, 2008)). 
216 Protosoftware, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0905 (citing Deutsche Post 
AG v. NJDomains, WIPO Case No. D2006-0001 (Mar. 1, 2006)). 
217 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A., WIPO Case No. 
D2013-1838 (quoting Rudy Rojas v. Gary Davis, WIPO Case No. D2004-
1081 (Apr. 18, 2005)).  
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which the complaint was denied, the panel found reverse 
domain name hijacking in three of them.218 
 In the proceeding involving the domain name 
<proto.com>, the panel stated that it was unnecessary to 
address the first two elements of paragraph 4(a), given the 
panel’s “fundamental finding” that the complainant failed to 
establish the respondent’s bad faith.219 Here, the respondent 
registered the domain name years before the complainant 
filed its application for trademark registration and began 
using the mark.220 Thus, in these circumstances, the 
respondent could not have been aware of the complainant’s 
mark, and could not have acted in bad faith in registering 
the domain name.221 The panel found reverse domain name 
hijacking and declared that the complaint was brought in 
bad faith and was an abuse of the Policy: “The Panel 
considers that the Complainant is represented by Counsel 
who even on a rudimentary examination of the Policy and 
its[] application in this area should have appreciated that the 
Complaint could not succeed . . . .”222 The panel’s cautionary 
language on the cavalier resort to a UDRP proceeding is 
worthy of note: 
Initiating domain name dispute resolution 
proceedings necessarily involves putting the 
parties to a considerable expenditure of time 
                                                
 
 
218 Id.; Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., WIPO Case No. 
D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008); Protosoftware, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-
0905. 
219 Protosoftware, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0905. 
220 See supra text accompanying note 184. 
221 Protosoftware, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0905. 
222 Id. 
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and in many cases cost and the Policy must not 
be used unless the complainant has a 
reasonable and credible belief it is entitled to 
succeed. In particular, proceedings must not be 
commenced in a brash and totally unjustifiable 
attempt to pressure a domain name owner into 
releasing a legitimately held domain name that 
considerably pre-dates any trademark rights 
held by the complainant.223 
 
In the decision involving the domain name 
<gopets.net>,224 the respondent had previously registered the 
mark GOPETS. Ten months before the subject UDRP 
proceeding, the respondent commenced an action against 
the complainant in the U.S. district court, seeking transfer of 
the domain name <gopets.com> from the complainant.225 
Five weeks before the complainant filed its UDRP complaint, 
the district court issued a preliminary injunction against the 
complainant “on the grounds that the Respondent would be 
‘likely to succeed on the merits of its service mark 
infringement claim.’”226 The panel emphasized the court’s 
statement that “‘the law is clear that ownership of a domain 
name alone does not confer any rights to a trademark in the 
                                                
 
 
223 Id. (citing Sustainable Forestry Mgmt. Ltd. v. SFM.com, WIPO Case 
No. D2002-0535 (Sept. 13, 2002)). 
224 Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., WIPO Case No. 
D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008). 
225 GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, No. CV 07-1870 AHM VBKX (C.D. Cal. Mar. 
2007). 
226 Dig. Overture Inc., WIPO Case No. D2008-0091 (quoting GoPets Ltd., 
No. CV 07-1870 AHM VBKX). 
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same name.’”227 Thus, the complainant was on notice that it 
could not establish any rights in its mark, under paragraph 
4(a)(i). The panel added that the complainant’s case was 
“similarly fatally weak” with respect to the respondent’s 
right or interest in the domain name and the bad faith 
element.228 A majority of the panel found reverse domain 
name hijacking,229 stating, “The Complainant should have 
known its case was fatally weak. . . . It seems plain that the 
Complainant, had it properly understood what was 
required, would have understood that it could not make its 
case.”230 The panel also cautioned the complainant and 
prospective complainants:  
It is also notable that [WIPO] provides a 
substantial amount of information on its 




228 Id.  
229 One panelist dissented on the finding. For a discussion, see infra text 
accompanying notes 273-75.  
230 Dig. Overture Inc., WIPO Case No. D2008-0091. The complainant also 
lost in the court action. The district court’s partial summary judgment in 
favor of the respondent concluded that the complainant’s use of the 
domain name <gopets.com> violated the respondent’s rights under the 
Lanham Act. The court of appeals affirmed this and other portions of the 
judgment in favor of the respondent, but reversed and remanded on one 
of the respondent’s claims under the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and the district court’s award of 
attorneys’ fees. GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, 657 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2011). 
On remand, the only issue before the district court was the matter of 
attorneys’ fees. Emphasizing the complainant’s “bad faith and 
willfulness,” the court awarded the respondent fees in the amount of 
$40,335. GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, No. CV 07-1870 AHM VBKX, 2012 WL 
3962789, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012), aff’d, 595 F. App’x 721 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
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website, to fully inform parties about 
conducting disputes under the Policy. This 
includes a model Complaint, which the 
Complainant in this case has used. The notes 
embedded in that model Complaint relevantly 
instruct a complainant to “specify the 
trademark(s) or service mark(s) on which the 
Complaint is based and, for each mark, 
describe the goods or services, if any, in 
connection with which the mark is used.” This 
was evidently a part of that template which the 
Complainant ignored.231 
 
 Finally, in the decision challenging the domain name 
<neodent.com>, the panel stated that it “need look no 
further than the Complaint to determine that the 
Complainant has not established that the Respondent 
registered the disputed domain name in bad faith.”232 
Indeed, the panel did not address the first two elements of 
paragraph 4(a), other than referring to the parties’ 
contentions relating to them. As discussed above, the panel 
determined that there was no evidence that the respondent, 
“who does business only in the Republic of Korea, knew of 
the Complainant or its NEODENT marks when the 
Respondent registered the domain name in 2002, five years 
before the Complainant obtained its Korean trademark, or of 
facts that might support an inference of knowledge.”233 The 
                                                
 
 
231 Dig. Overture Inc., WIPO Case No. D2008-0091.   
232 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013). 
233 Id. 
496 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
panel rejected the complainant’s argument regarding 
constructive notice of the mark’s registration and “renown” 
of the mark.234   
Declaring that a finding of reverse domain name 
hijacking was appropriate, the panel relied on three reasons. 
First, the panel was critical of the complainant, represented 
by counsel, for disregarding the “longstanding rule of 
decision in Policy proceedings” that rejects the U.S. doctrine 
of constructive notice for UDRP proceedings, at least where 
non-U.S. parties are involved. “The Complainant offers the 
Panel no reason why in this proceeding the Panel should 
depart from or modify settled Policy precedent.”235 Second, 
the complainant committed “a more serious pleading 
error.”236 Given that there was evidence (in both Korean and 
English) that the respondent operated a dental clinic in 
Korea under the name “NEO Dental Clinic” from twelve 
years before the filing of the complaint, the panel stated that 
the complainant “could and should have verified” its 
allegation in the complaint that the respondent “has never 
been known by the disputed domain name.”237 The panel 
described the pleading as “misleading to the point of 
attempting to deceive the Panel.”238 “Third, the 







238 Id. The panel explained, “This alone has been held grounds for finding 
RDNH.” Id. (citing Timbermate Prods. Pty Ltd. v. Domains by Proxy, 
LLC/Barry Gork, WIPO Case No. D2013-1603 (Nov. 3, 2013); Coöperatie 
Univé U.A. v. Ashantiplc Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2011-0636) (June 30, 
2011)). 
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Complainant’s basic theory of its case raises issues far 
outside the limited jurisdiction and competence of a UDRP 
panel, and the Complainant or its representative should 
have known it.”239 
In another decision, involving the domain name 
<newsrepublic.com>, the panel noted that the complainant 
failed “even to make a prima facie case showing that the 
Respondent lacks right or legitimate interest”240 and also 
failed to establish the bad faith element.241 In denying the 
complaint, the panel added in a footnote, “[T]he Panel 
unanimously finds the allegations and evidence of [the] 
Complainant to be seriously inadequate to establish a 
successful case.”242 The panel’s words that follow sound of 
the cautionary language seen in previous decisions where 
reverse domain name hijacking was found: “The Panel 
wishes to remind Complainant that, under the Policy, the 
responsibility rests on Complainant to fully comprehend the 
Policy and to provide sufficient legal allegations to establish 
its rights, along with evidence to support such 
allegations.”243 Nevertheless, there was no mention of 
reverse domain name hijacking in the decision, nor did the 
respondent request it.244   
                                                
 
 
239 Id.  
240 Mobile’s Republic v. Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2014-0089 
(Apr. 23, 2014). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. n.6. 
243 Id. 
244 The panel declined the respondent’s request for a finding of reverse 
domain name hijacking in five decisions. The panel offered its reasons 
for doing so in the following three decisions, where it had denied the 
complaint: 
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Heimbs Kaffee GmbH & Co. KG v. Ho Kyoung Trading Co, 
Ltd., Heui-il Kang, WIPO Case No. D2011-1407 (Oct. 17, 
2011) (“In this present case, the Complainant 1) has in 
fact a valid trademark registration for ALLEGRETTO 
dated earlier than the registration of the disputed 
domain name, and 2) found the disputed domain name 
identical to its trademark, and used only on a website 
indicating that the domain name was for sale. It is the 
Panel’s view that the Complainant, not having all facts 
and arguments, had understandable reasons to file the 
Complaint.”);  
Nursefinders, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. 
D2007-0417 (July 5, 2007) (“[T]he Complainant holds 
registered marks that are nearly identical to the Domain 
Name and has used the NURSEFINDERS mark for more 
than thirty years. The Complaint was advanced with 
ultimately unpersuasive claims, but there is no 
indication that the Complaint was brought to harass the 
Respondent as a competitor. Moreover, this Respondent 
was found to have acted in bad faith in some of the 
earlier UDRP proceedings in which it was involved. 
Thus, while the Complainant has failed to establish all of 
the elements of a Policy complaint, the Panel does not 
conclude that the Complainant initiated this proceeding 
in bad faith.”);  
Reckitt Benckiser Plc v. Eunsook Wi, WIPO Case No. 
D2009-0239 (May 20, 2009) (“In the present case, where 
the Complainant owns if limited common law trade 
mark rights identical to the second level domain name, 
there is no room for a reverse domain name hijacking 
order.”). 
In two other decisions, the respondent requested a finding of 
reverse domain name hijacking, but the panel ruled in favor of the 
complainant and ordered a transfer of the domain name. Samsung Elecs. 
Co. v. Pimser Elecs. Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2009-1630 (Feb. 16, 2010); 
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III.   THE SEPARATE OPINIONS 
 
The similarities between arbitration and the UDRP 
proceeding continue to the decision stage. A decision by any 
three-member tribunal requires deliberations within the 
collective body. UDRP decisions are no exception. Like the 
rules of most arbitral organizations, the Policy, the UDRP 
Rules, and the WIPO Supplemental Rules do not provide 
any mention of, or guidance on, the panel’s internal 
deliberations. As with many arbitration cases involving 
multi-member panels, the manner and extent of the UDRP 
panel’s deliberation is entirely up to its members.245  
                                                                                                         
 
 
SMS Demag AG v. Seung Gon, Kim, WIPO Case No. D2000-1434 (Jan. 
19, 2001).  
245 Because UDRP proceedings generally have no in-person hearings, 
internal deliberations will most likely be by electronic means. Given the 
international composition of many UDRP panels (which is the case in all 
of the 58 decisions), deliberations would be necessary especially where 
party submissions and portions of the case record are in a language in 
which an individual panelist may not have proficiency, requiring 
summaries of translations or similar assistance by another member of the 
panel with proficiency in that language. Of the 58 proceedings, the panel 
in the following seven included at least one non-Korean panelist, where 
the decision was published in Korean. (The nationality of the non-
Korean panelist is indicated, per the guidelines provided in the 
Appendix.) News Corp. v. Yoon Jinsu, WIPO Case No. D2005-0504 (Aug. 
5, 2005) (Ricketson, Australia); NBC Universal, Inc. v. Junak Kwon, 
WIPO Case No. D2004-0764 (Dec. 23, 2004) (Barker, New Zealand); 
Societe Air France v. Daung Soo Ghim, WIPO Case No. D2003-0891 (Feb. 
13, 2003) (Vivant, France); Produits Berger v. Pil Technlogy Korea Ltd., 
WIPO Case No. D2003-0192 (May 31, 2003) (Bensoussan, France); Konica 
Corp. v. [Jin Hee Lee], WIPO Case No. D2003-0101 (May 23, 2003) 
(Limbury, Great Britain/Australia); Societe Nationale de Television 
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With respect to the tribunal’s ultimate decision, the 
rules of the leading arbitral organizations require that the 
award be in writing and state the reasons upon which the 
award is based.246 These rules also acknowledge the 
possibility of a divided vote and decision by a majority.247 
Identical provisions appear in the UDRP Rules: “The Panel’s 
decision shall be in writing, provide the reasons on which it 
is based . . . .”;248 and “[i]n the case of a three-member Panel, 
the Panel’s decision shall be made by a majority.”249 While 
some arbitration administering organizations do not address 
explicitly the matter of the dissenting opinion, the UDRP 
                                                                                                         
 
 
France3 v. [Segwon Kim], WIPO Case No. D2002-1181 (May 9, 2003) 
(Dreyfus, France); Experian Info. Solutions, Inc. v. [Suh Jung Gohn], 
WIPO Case No. D2002-0368 (Sept. 6, 2002) (Hunter, Australia; U.S.). 
246 AAA Int’l Rules, supra note 54, art. 30(1); ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 
31(2); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 26.2. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra 
note 54, art. 34(2) & (3). Some organizations provide that the parties may 
agree that no reasons are to be given. AAA Int’l Rules, supra note 54, art. 
30(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 26.2. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra 
note 54, art. 34(3). 
247 AAA Int’l Rules, supra note 54, art. 29(2); ICC Rules, supra note 54, art. 
31(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 26.5. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra 
note 54, art. 33(1). Some rules provide that where there is no majority, 
the president or presiding arbitrator makes the decision. ICC Rules, supra 
note 54, art. 31(1); LCIA Rules, supra note 54, art. 26.5. 
248 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 15(d).  
249 Id. ¶ 15(c).  
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framework contemplates the possibility of the dissenting 
opinion and addresses it squarely.250  
In international arbitration, there has been significant 
discussion regarding the utility of dissenting opinions.251 
Alan Redfern, among others, is critically opposed to the 
practice:  
[F]irst, . . . they may inhibit that open 
discussion which ought to take place secretly 
and within the confines of the arbitral tribunal. 
Secondly, . . . they may cast doubts on the 
correctness or validity of the award made by 
the majority. Thirdly, . . . they do not serve to 
advance the development of the law, since 
there is no doctrine of precedence in 
arbitrations and, in general no appeal against 
                                                
 
 
250 “Panel decisions and dissenting opinions shall normally comply with 
the guidelines as to length set forth in the Provider’s Supplemental 
Rules. Any dissenting opinion shall accompany the majority decision.” 
Id. ¶ 15(e). The UDRP prescription that a dissenting opinion “shall 
accompany the majority decision” is perhaps included in light of the 
general understanding in arbitration that a dissenting opinion is not part 
of the award. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 389 (4th ed. 2004); Peter J. 
Rees QC & Patrick Rohn, Dissenting Opinions: Can They Fulfil a Beneficial 
Role?, 25 ARB. INT’L 329, 333 (2009). The UDRP rule avoids the (one 
hopes) rare situation in arbitration where the dissenting opinion surfaces 
after the award is issued, sometimes without the knowledge of the 
majority or the administering organization, when the dissenter reveals 
the opinion to the losing party.  
251 For a summary, see Ilhyung Lee, Introducing International Commercial 
Arbitration and Its Lawlessness, by Way of the Dissenting Opinion, 4 
CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 19 (2011), and citations therein. 
502 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
the award of an arbitral tribunal and no open 
publication of that tribunal’s award.252 
 
Others argue that a proper dissent can be beneficial.253 
Although the UDRP process borrows much from the 
arbitration method, given some of the differences between 
the two (mainly that the UDRP decision is not necessarily 
binding), the reasons for opposing a dissent in arbitration do 
not transfer perfectly to the UDRP setting. With respect to 
WIPO-administered decisions particularly, note the 
provider’s understanding that “with UDRP decisions 
covering a multitude of facts and arguments, genuine 
differences of opinion may be difficult to avoid on particular 
issues, all the more so where panelists and parties come 
from a multitude of jurisdictions. Moreover, these opinions 
must be formed in the context of a rapidly evolving Domain 
Name System and Internet.”254  
                                                
 
 
252 Alan Redfern, The 2003 Freshfields Lecture – Dissenting Opinions in 
International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 20 
ARB. INT’L 223, 240 (2004); see REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 250, at 391-
92. 
253 Richard M. Mosk, The Debate Over Dissenting and Concurring Opinions 
in International Arbitration, 26 UWLA L. REV. 51, 53-54 (1995) (stating that 
dissenting, as well as concurring, opinions “should be allowed in 
international arbitration and are useful” and “can be “influential” and “a 
source of legal reasoning”). See Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, 
Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration, in LIBER AMICORUM BENGT 
BROMS 259, 283 (Matt Tupamäki ed., 1999) (“Dissenting opinions can 
improve the legitimacy and performance of international arbitration, and 
thus offer significant benefits that offset the risks posed.”).  
254 WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 26 (prefatory text). 
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WIPO also notes that although “[t]he UDRP does not 
operate on a strict doctrine of precedent”255 and prior 
decisions are not binding on panelists,256 the organization 
apparently desires to “maximize the consistency” of the 
UDRP system,257 one that operates in a “predictable manner 
for all parties.”258 As one commentator noted, “[T]he UDRP 
has in effect given rise to a new system of international 
common law, with panelists increasingly citing to, and relying 
upon, previous UDRP decisions.”259 Over time, “consensus 
or clear majority views”260 may emerge. Along the way, 
well-reasoned dissenting statements by individual panelists 
may provoke thought and prompt deliberative discussion 
within the international pool of panelists, and perhaps serve 
as the basis for sound majority rules in the future.261 
From the 58 decisions herein, there are ten in which 
disagreement within the panel is noted from the text of the 
publicly available decision. Of these ten:  
                                                
 
 
255 Id. ¶ 4.1. (“What deference is owed to past UDRP decisions dealing 
with similar factual matters or legal issues?”) 
256 Id. (prefatory text). 
257 Id.  
258 Id. ¶ 4.1. (“What deference is owed to past UDRP decisions dealing 
with similar factual matters or legal issues?”). “[P]redictability remains a 
key element of dispute resolution systems . . . .” Id. (prefatory text). 
259 Sorkin, supra note 18, at 43 (citing David G. Post, Juries and the UDRP, 
ICANN WATCH (Sept. 6, 2000), 
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/juries_and_the_udrp.htm) 
(emphasis added)).  
260 WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 26 (prefatory text). 
261 It was apparently the concern that future panelists may be persuaded 
by the dissent in Guru Denim Inc. v. Ibrahim Ali Ibrahim Abu-Harb, WIPO 
Case No. D2013-1324 (Sept. 27, 2013), that prompted in the commentary 
a rousing defense of the majority’s approach. See Cyberlaw, supra note 34.  
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•   Two are not on the merits of the decision. One 
relates to the necessity of making a finding on the 
first element of paragraph 4(a), given the 
dispositive nature of the panel’s finding on the 
bad faith element; the other is a dissent from the 
majority’s determination of the proper language of 
the proceeding. 
•   One decision includes a panelist’s dissent from the 
majority’s finding of reverse domain name 
hijacking.  
•   Another decision records a dissent from the 
majority’s refusal to find reverse domain name 
hijacking. The same decision is also noteworthy in 
that the panel’s unanimous decision denying the 
complaint attaches two concurring opinions. 
•   The remaining six decisions see an individual 
panelist’s dissent from the ultimate outcome of the 
dispute.  
 
We turn to the decisions.   
 
A.    ELEMENTS, LANGUAGE, RDNH 
 
 In the proceeding involving the domain name 
<shoulderdoc.com>, the panel denied the complaint on the 
ground that the complainant failed to establish the required 
bad faith element of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.262 The 
panel stated that in view of its conclusion regarding the bad 
                                                
 
 
262 Shoulderdoc Ltd. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0625 
(Sept. 8, 2006). 
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faith element, it was not necessary to make a finding 
regarding the respondent’s right or legitimate interest in the 
domain name. Regarding the first element, concerning 
identical or confusing similarity to a mark in which the 
complainant has rights, the majority of the panel decided 
that the complainant’s use of its own domain name 
<shoulderdoc.co.uk> was sufficient to establish common 
law rights in a mark.263 But “[o]ne member of the Panel 
would decline to reach a finding on this question, on the 
ground that the Panel’s finding as to bad faith is dispositive 
of the present matter.”264 That member of the panel is not 
identified, and there is no separate opinion or further 
elaboration. 
A disagreement regarding the proper language of the 
proceeding brought a separate opinion in NBC Universal, Inc. 
v. Junak Kwon.265 There, the U.S. complainants challenged the 
Korean respondent’s registration and use of the domain 
name <nbcuniversal.com>. The panel unanimously 
determined that the complainants satisfied the requisite 
three elements of paragraph 4(a), and ordered the transfer of 
the domain name to the complainants. The panel’s decision 
was in Korean, with two of the panelists deciding that 
Korean was the language of the proceeding. The non-Korean 
panelist disagreed on this point.266 
Given the possibility of parties from different 
countries and languages coming together in a domain name 
                                                
 
 
263 Id.  
264 Id. 
265 WIPO Case No. D2004-0764 (Dec. 23, 2004) [in Korean]. 
266 Id. (Opinion of Sir Ian Barker). 
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dispute, the UDRP Rules specifically address the question of 
the language of the proceeding: 
11. Language of Proceedings 
(a)  Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, or 
specified otherwise in the Registration 
Agreement, the language of the 
administrative proceeding shall be the 
language of the Registration Agreement, 
subject to the authority of the Panel to 
determine otherwise, having regard to the 
circumstances of the administrative 
proceeding. 
(b)  The Panel may order that any documents 
submitted in languages other than the 
language of the administrative proceeding 
be accompanied by a translation in whole 
or in part into the language of the 
administrative proceeding.267 
 
In the <nbcuniversal.com> decision, the complainants filed 
the complaint in English on the belief that the registration 
agreement was in English. After the registrar advised WIPO 
that the registration agreement was in Korean, WIPO 
ordered the complainants to submit a Korean translation of 
the complaint, to which the complainants complied.268 The 
respondent did not file a response. The majority of the panel 
stated that under paragraph 11, the availability of the 
                                                
 
 
267 UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 11. 
268 Over the years, WIPO’s practice in such circumstances has evolved. 
See Lee, supra note 18.  
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registration agreement in English (as well as in Korean) and 
the complainant’s lack of fluency in Korean were not 
sufficient reasons to depart from the language of the 
registration agreement. The majority also noted that the 
respondent used the English language only briefly for its 
website and that the procedures for the respondent to follow 
were spelled out in Korean. Thus, the majority declared that 
the decision would be in Korean.269 Panelist Sir Ian Barker 
filed a separate opinion, stating, “I respectfully disagree with 
the opinion of the majority that Korean should be the 
language of the proceedings,” and offered “the following 
reasons that require English. 
(a)  The Respondent demonstrated some facility with 
the English language in his email communications 
to the Center. 
(b)  The disputed domain name includes a word in the 
English language (universal) and clearly relates to 
companies in an English-speaking country. 
(c)  The content on the Respondent’s website is in 
English and shows that he may communicate his 
views in that language. 
(d)  The fact that the Respondent has filed no response 
even to the Korean complaint.270   
                                                
 
 
269 NBC Universal, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2004-0764. 
270 Id. (Opinion of Sir Ian Barker). On the merits, Panelist Barker wrote, “I 
agree with the majority that the complaint be allowed and transfer of the 
Disputed Domain Name ordered. I have been supplied with a translation 
of the operative part of the decision by the Presiding Panelist and I agree 
with it.” Id. The case appears to be one of the few in which the text of the 
decision reveals that a particular panelist was included in the list 
provided by one of the parties. Panelist Barker stated that he was chosen 
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Panelist Barker relied on prior UDRP decisions with similar 
circumstances in which the panel decided to depart from the 
Korean language of the registration agreement and to 
proceed in English.271  
As noted above, in the decision involving the domain 
name <gopets.net>,272 the panel unanimously denied the 
complaint based on its conclusion that the complainant 
failed to meet any of the three requirements under 
paragraph 4(a), with particular attention to the 
complainant’s failure to show any rights in a relevant 
trademark. A majority of the panel also found reverse 
domain name hijacking against the complainant, reasoning 
that there was “sufficient evidence that the Complainant 
brought the Complaint either deliberately knowing of its 
flaws, or that it should have been aware of them.”273 The 
decision continues, “One Panelist, however, considers that 
the Complainant should be given the benefit of the doubt on 
this point, since it is unrepresented by counsel. On this 
alternative, it is possible that the Complainant simply 
misunderstood the scope of the Policy.”274 The panelist is not 
identified, and there is no separate opinion. The dissenter’s 
position would be defensible under the guidelines, offered 
                                                                                                         
 
 
as a panelist by WIPO from a list of three provided by the complainant. 
Id.  
271 Id. (citations omitted).  
272 Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., WIPO Case No. 
D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008). 
273 Id. 
274 Id.   
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by a later panel decision within the 58, that a determination 
of reverse domain name hijacking “is always within the 
panel’s discretion,” and even where the evidence indicates 
that the complainant used the proceeding in bad faith and in 
an attempt to deprive the respondent of its domain name, 






B.   THREE OPINIONS, TWO CONCURRING, ONE DISSENTING 
IN PART 
 
The result in Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc. v. Kwang 
pyo Kim,276 may well be the UDRP’s version of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. United 
States.277 In New York Times Co., the Court rejected the 
government’s request to enjoin two newspapers from 
publishing the “Pentagon Papers.”278 The Court’s decision 
included a per curiam opinion, and nine separate opinions, 
one by each member of the Court – six concurring279 and 
                                                
 
 
275 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim, 
WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 (Dec. 20, 2013) (quoting Rudy Rojas v. Gary 
Davis, WIPO Case No. D2004-1081 (Apr. 18, 2005)).  
276 WIPO Case No. D2011-0075 (Mar. 31, 2011). 
277 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
278 Id.  
279 Id. at 714 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. 
at 724 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 727 (Stewart. J., concurring); id. at 
730 (White, J., concurring); id. at 740 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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three dissenting.280 In Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc., the 
panel denied the complaint, but that was the only issue on 
which the three panelists were unanimous.281 The decision 
signed by the presiding panelist is followed by another 
panelist’s concurring opinion offering different grounds for 
denying the complaint.282 These two panelists also formed a 
majority to deny the respondent’s request for a finding of 
reverse domain name hijacking. The third panelist’s separate 
opinion concurred with the decision to deny the complaint 
on grounds virtually identical to those of the presiding 
panelist, but dissented from the majority’s refusal to find 
reverse domain name hijacking.283  
The respondent in Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc. 
registered the domain name <firestore.com> on December 
24, 1999. From 2001 to 2008, the domain name resolved to a 
website that offered electronic goods for sale.284 The website 
was later changed, and, at the time of the UDRP proceeding, 
was “a referral website featuring pay-per-click links to other 
websites promoting and selling firefighting equipment and 
related goods.”285 The complainant was a U.S. company 
based in Pennsylvania that – beginning from 1999 – sold 
equipment and supplies to fire, police, “EMS,” and military 
personnel, under the trademark “thefirestore.com”. In 
September 2006, the complainant applied to register the 
                                                
 
 
280 Id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 752 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. 
at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
281 WIPO Case No. D2011-0075. 
282 Id. (Hudis, Pan., concurring). 
283 Id. (Brown, Pan., concurring). 
284 Id. (Pan. Decision).  
285 Id. 
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mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and 
received registration in January 2008.286  
Presiding Panelist Gabriela Kennedy “accept[ed] that 
the Complainant presently has rights in the 
‘the[]firestore.com’ trade mark” based on its registration in 
2008.287 She wrote that although the complainant obtained 
the trademark registration after the respondent registered the 
domain name, “Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy does not 
require that the Complainant show it had rights in the trade 
mark at the time that the Disputed Domain Name was 
registered, but rather it merely requires that such right exists 
at the time of filing the Complaint.”288 Completing the 
discussion of the first element, the presiding panelist found 
that the domain name <firestore.com> was confusingly 
similar to the complainant’s mark “thefirestore.com”.289 
Turning to the second element of the respondent’s right or 





288 Id. (citing Digital Vision, Ltd. v. Advanced Chemill Sys., WIPO Case 
No. D2001-0827 (Sept. 23, 2001); Esquire Innovations, Inc. v. [] Vertical 
Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0856 (Oct. 5, 2007)). She added:  
Whether the Complainant had rights in the trade mark 
at the time of registration of the Disputed Domain Name 
may be relevant to the consideration of bad faith under 
paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, but it is not relevant for 
the purposes of determining whether the Disputed 
Domain Name is confusingly similar to a trade mark in 
which the Complainant has rights.  
Id. 
289 Id.  
512 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
interest in the domain name, the presiding panelist agreed 
with the respondent’s view that the domain name was of a 
descriptive nature and that there was no evidence to show 
that the respondent knew of the complainant’s mark. 
Accordingly, the presiding panelist found that the 
complainant failed to establish the second element. 
Although the complaint failed on this ground, and it was not 
necessary to address the bad faith element, the presiding 
panelist thought “it fit to look at the third requirement” in 
light of the respondent’s request for a finding of reverse 
domain name hijacking.290  
Presiding Panelist Kennedy emphasized that 
paragraph 4(a)(iii) imposed a “conjunctive requirement,” 
necessitating proof of both bad faith registration and bad 
faith use. With respect to bad faith registration, she noted 
that “[b]y the Complainant’s own admission, the 
Respondent did not register the Disputed Domain Name in 
bad faith.”291 Moreover, the presiding panelist pointed out 
that the complainant did not have a trademark registration 
for “thefirestore.com” when the respondent registered the 
domain name; there was insufficient evidence to show that 
the complainant had common law rights in the mark at the 
time the domain name was registered; and given that the 
domain name “consisted of descriptive generic terms,” there 
was no evidence that the complainant’s mark “obtained any 
great degree of fame or secondary meaning” before the 
domain name was registered, “certainly none that extended 
                                                
 
 
290 Id.  
291 Id.  
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to South Korea, where the Respondent resides.”292 Thus, the 
presiding panelist noted, the complainant could not have 
satisfied paragraph 4(a)(iii). She did state, however, that the 
respondent’s recent use of the domain name for a website 
that included links to the complainant’s competitors was 
“suggestive of bad faith.”293 Regarding reverse domain name 
hijacking, Presiding Panelist Kennedy wrote that “the 
Complainant had an arguable case at least,” and declined to 
find that the complaint “was frivolous or that it was filed 
merely to harass the Respondent.”294  
Panelist Jonathan Hudis filed a concurring opinion. 
To him, the “fatal flaw” in the complainant’s case was its 
“lack of proof of priority” in the mark.295 “The Complainant 
has not shown that it possessed registered or common law 
trade mark rights in ‘TheFireStore.com’ prior to the 
Respondent’s registration of the Disputed Domain 
Name.”296 According to Panelist Hudis, the complaint failed 
on that ground alone, and presumably, it was unnecessary to 
address the latter two elements of paragraph 4(a). His 
opinion continues, however. He described the respondent’s 
re-tasked website, which directed Internet users to the 
complainant’s competitors, as “objectionable use” and 
“progressive encroachment,” and determined that the 
respondent did not have a right or legitimate interest in the 
domain name.297 The panelist also stated that the 
                                                
 
 
292 Id.  
293 Id. 
294 Id.  
295 Id. (Hudis, Pan., concurring). 
296 Id.  
297 Id.  
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respondent’s use of the domain name “arguably, cause[d] 
confusion,” and was “arguably infringing” and “arguably . . 
. bad faith use.”298 Regarding the bad faith element, the 
panelist wrote: 
I further depart from that part of the Presiding 
Panelist’s opinion stating that it is unnecessary 
to discuss bad faith (in view of the 
Complainant’s failure to prevail under 
paragraphs 4(a)(i) or 4(a)(ii) of the Policy),[299] 
and then devote a whole section of the decision 
to bad faith. To this Panelist, such a circular 
approach makes no sense.300   
 
Finally, Panelist Hudis agreed wholly with the presiding 
panelist’s decision against a finding of reverse domain name 
hijacking.301 
 The Honorable Neil Brown Q.C. filed an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Regarding the first 
element, he concurred with the presiding panelist that the 
complainant satisfied the requirements therein. He wrote, “It 
is sometimes said that for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(i) 
of the Policy, a complainant need satisfy only a 
                                                
 
 
298 Id.  
299 To clarify, the presiding panelist determined that the complainant 
satisfied the element in paragraph 4(a)(i), but not (ii). Panelist Hudis 
would have found that the complainant did not satisfy (i), but did satisfy 
(ii). Id. 
300 Id. “Moreover, . . . I do not wish to enter the debate whether any 
complainant needs to prove bad faith use and registration to establish its 
case under the Policy.” Id.  
301 Id.  
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comparatively low threshold. Thus, for example, the 
prevailing view seems to be that a complainant need only 
show that it has a trade mark at the time the complaint is 
filed.”302 Regarding the respondent’s right or interest in the 
domain name, Panelist Brown concurred with the presiding 
panelist “for the reasons given” that the complainant did not 
satisfy this element. He likewise concurred with the 
presiding panelist that there was no bad faith registration. 
Nonetheless, departing from the presiding panelist 
regarding bad faith use, he wrote, “[T]he Complainant has 
not satisfied paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy in so far as it 
relates to bad faith use.”303 
Panelist Brown disagreed with the majority’s decision 
declining to find reverse domain name hijacking, in a 
strongly worded dissent:  
                                                
 
 
302 Id. (Brown, Pan., concurring in part, dissenting in part). He added: 
Accordingly, it may be the case that the Complainant in 
the present proceedings has satisfied the requirement of 
paragraph 4(a)(i) as a matter of literal interpretation of 
the Policy, for it “has” trademark rights, even if it did 
not have them when the Disputed Domain Name was 
registered. But it should be noted that its trademark 
rights are weak and will not allow it to prevail in these 
proceedings. That is so because the trademark in 
question was not applied for until 7 years after the 
Disputed Domain Name was registered and was not 
issued until 9 years after the Disputed Domain Name 
was registered. As such, it is clear that the trademark 
relied on will not enable a finding that the Disputed 
Domain Name was registered in bad faith. 
Id. 
303 Id.  
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In the present case, it is clear that there was no 
ground for filing the complaint and that this 
was known to the Complainant. That is so 
because the Complainant has made the 
unusual but frank admission that the domain 
name was not registered in bad faith. That 
being so, the Complainant must have been 
fixed with knowledge, at the time it filed the 
Complaint, that it would not be able to prove 
one of the elements required to be proved, 
namely that within the meaning of paragraph 
4(a)(iii), the Disputed Domain Name had not 
only been used in bad faith, but had been 
registered in bad faith. That, by itself, is a 
ground for making a finding of reverse domain 
name hijacking.304 
                                                
 
 
304 Id. He also added:  
[T]here is an air of unreality about the Complainant’s 
case of which it must have been aware. It has its own 
website, “www.thefirestore.com” and the domain name 
leading to that website is clearly <thefirestore.com>. A 
search shows that the domain name is registered in the 
name Jeff Smith Private Registration and that it was 
registered on August 12, 1999. Despite this privacy 
registration, it is apparent that the Complainant made a 
conscious decision to register, not <firestore.com>, 
which it could have registered, but <thefirestore.com>. It 
seems unreal for it to claim 11 years later that the 
Respondent has no right to and registered in bad faith a 
domain name that it could have registered itself, but did 
not and a domain name that another party subsequently 
registered and used to promote goods coming within its 
generic meaning.  
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Ultimately, for Panelist Brown, the case for a finding of 
reverse domain name hijacking was “not a marginal one but 
a strong one.”305 
At this juncture, a table offering in one glance a 
summary of the three panelists’ respective views might be 
helpful: 
Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc. [U.S.] v. Kwang pyo Kim 
[Korea] 
Complainant’s mark: “thefirestore.com”; Respondent’s 
domain name: <firestore.com> 
 
WIPO Case No. 2011-0075 (Mar. 31, 2011) 
 


























does not have 
Respondent 





                                                                                                         
 
 
Id.         
305 Id. 
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No bad faith 
registration. 




In review, the panel was unanimous in its decision to 
deny the complaint. A majority (Kennedy and Brown) 
determined that the complainant proved that the domain 
name was identical or confusingly similar to a mark in 
which the complainant had rights.307 The same majority 
concluded that the complainant failed to prove that the 
respondent did not have a right or interest in the domain 
name. With respect to the bad faith element, Panelist Hudis 
wrote that it was not necessary to address it; Presiding 
                                                
 
 
306 “I would decide this matter based upon the Complainant’s failure of 
proof regarding its trade mark priority.” Id. (Hudis, Pan., concurring). 
307 Regarding the first element, and specifically, the situation of a domain 
name that is registered before the complainant’s registration of a mark or 
common law rights in the mark, the Presiding Panelist and Panelist 
Brown’s approach appears to be the consensus view. WIPO reports: 
“Registration of a domain name before a complainant acquires 
trademark rights in a name does not prevent a finding of identity or 
confusing similarity under the UDRP. The UDRP makes no specific 
reference to the date on which the holder of the trademark or service 
mark acquired rights.” WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 26, ¶ 1.4. Of 
course, precisely as the two panelists intimated, WIPO notes that “in 
such circumstances it may be difficult to prove that the domain name 
was registered in bad faith under the third element of the UDRP.” Id.      
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Panelist Kennedy (who addressed it for the purpose of a 
reverse domain name hijacking determination) and Panelist 
Brown applied the “conjunctive requirement,” with the 
former finding an absence of bad faith registration but 
evidence of recent bad faith use, and the latter finding 
absence of both bad faith registration and bad faith use. A 
different majority (Kennedy and Hudis) declined to find 
reverse domain name hijacking, from which Brown 
dissented.  
Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc. makes for an 
interesting case study of a UDRP proceeding decided by a 
three-member panel. Had the proceeding been decided by a 
sole panelist, and WIPO appointed any one of the three 
panelists, and the individual panelists decided the matter on 
the respective grounds indicated in the three-member 
decision, the complaint would have been denied, though for 
different reasons. If Panelist Brown were the sole panelist, 
the respondent would have prevailed on its request for a 
finding of reverse domain name hijacking. In all events, the 
three panelists’ opinions, individually and as a group, 
contribute to a sharper understanding of the requisite 
elements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy.   
 
C.   DISSENT ON MERITS 
 
There are six decisions that include a dissent on the 
merits of the case. In the first two, the dissenting panelist 
disagreed with the majority’s decision to deny the 
complaint, and would have ordered a transfer of the 
disputed domain name. (The majority decision in both of 
these cases is written in Korean.) In the last four, the 
individual panelist dissented from the majority’s decision to 
order transfer of the domain name, and would have denied 
the complaint. These decisions are addressed in turn.  
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A.   DISSENT FROM DENIAL OF COMPLAINT 
 
a.    <FRANCE3.COM>  
 
The three-member panel decision involving the 
domain name <france3.com> came a year after a UDRP 
decision by a sole panelist involving the same parties and 
the same domain name.308 The proceeding before the three-
member panel was not an appeal of the decision by the sole 
panelist. The UDRP framework does not provide for 
appellate review of a panel decision by another panel. Thus, 
an initial question for the second panel was whether there 
was a proper re-filed complaint.309   
                                                
 
 
308 Societe Nationale de Television France3 v. Kim Segwon, WIPO Case 
No. D2001-1322 (Jan. 29, 2002) (sole panelist) [in Korean].   
309 WIPO provides:  
A refiled case concerns the complainant submitting a 
second complaint involving the same domain name(s) 
and the same respondent(s) as in an earlier complaint 
that had been denied. A refiled case may only be 
accepted in limited circumstances. These circumstances 
include when the complainant establishes in the 
complaint that relevant new actions have occurred since 
the original decision, or that a breach of natural justice 
or of due process has occurred, or that there was other 
serious misconduct in the original case (such as perjured 
evidence). A refiled complaint would usually also be 
accepted if it includes newly presented evidence that 
was reasonably unavailable to the complainant during 
the original case. 
WIPO Overview 2.0, supra note 26, ¶ 4.4 (“Under what circumstances can 
a refiled case be accepted?”). 
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To retrace, the Korean respondent registered the 
domain name on March 28, 2001.310 The domain name 
initially resolved to a website with pornographic content. 
The pictures were later removed, and replaced with a 
message that read, “sex solution. . . . We start the optimal 
website for you.”311 The complainant, a French television 
broadcasting company that registered and used the mark 
“FRANCE3” for its business, brought a UDRP complaint in 
November 2001.  
The sole panelist denied the complaint, reasoning that 
the complainant failed to satisfy the second and third 
elements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy.312 Regarding the 
respondent’s right or legitimate interest in the domain name, 
the panel noted that the respondent was preparing to use the 
domain name for the service of “providing adult 
information” (sung-in-jung-boh-jeh-gong-ub), and specifically 
referred to paragraph 4(c)(i).313 With respect to the bad faith 
element, the panel stated that there was inadequate evidence 
to show that the respondent registered the domain name to 
sell it to the complainant, and indeed, referred to the 
respondent’s plans to use it for the adult-oriented services. 
Moreover, the panel noted that although the complainant’s 
mark might be well-known in France and other parts of 
Europe, it was not so in Korea; indeed, the complainant did 
                                                
 
 
310 Societe Nationale de Television France3 v. [Segwon Kim], WIPO Case 
No. D2002-1181 (May 9, 2003) (three-member panel) [in Korean]. 
311 Societe Nationale de Television France3, WIPO Case No. D2001-1322. The 
phrase “sex solution” was in English; the rest is a translation from 
Korean text.  
312 Id.  
313 Id.  
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not register the mark in Korea. Finally, given the differences 
in the parties’ businesses, the panel added, there could not 
be confusion by Internet users.314  
Eleven months after the decision of the sole panelist, 
the complainant commenced another UDRP proceeding.315 
The complainant asserted that there was new evidence to 
show that after the previous panel decision, the respondent 
entered into a contract with a third party to sell the domain 
name for US$100,000, thus proving bad faith.316 In a twist, 
the respondent countered that it was the complainant who 
suggested to the third party that the third party contact the 
respondent to purchase the domain name.317 For the second 
proceeding, WIPO appointed three panelists: Nathalie 
Dreyfus, of France; Sang Jo Jung, of Korea (as the presiding 
panelist); and Dr. Jisuk Woo, of Korea. (The decision does 
not state which party elected to have the proceeding decided 
by a three-member panel.) Initially, the panel cited prior 
panel decisions to set forth the limited grounds for bringing 
a re-filed complaint.318 Ultimately, the panel appeared to 
accept the respondent’s contention that the complainant in 
effect arranged to have a third party contact the respondent 
to purchase the domain name from the respondent. Under 
                                                
 
 
314 Id.  
315 Societe Nationale de Television France3, WIPO Case No. D2002-1181. 
316 Id.  
317 Id. The decision does not mention whether the complainant sought to 
contest the respondent’s charge.  
318 Id. (citing Grove Broad. Co. v. Telesystems Commc’ns Ltd., WIPO 
Case No. D2000-0703 (Nov. 10, 2000); Creo Prods. Inc. v. Website In Dev., 
WIPO Case No. D2000-1490 (Jan. 19, 2001); Furrytails Ltd. v. Andrew 
Mitchell, WIPO Case No. D2001-0857 (Sept. 6, 2001)).  
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these circumstances, the panel observed, the complainant 
should not be permitted to bring a re-filed complaint.319 The 
panel explicitly referred to the principle of “estoppel” 
(parenthetically, in English).320 The panel therefore denied 
the complaint.  
The decision also noted that after the sole panelist’s 
previous resolution of the dispute, the complainant sought 
to retrieve the domain name by bringing an action against 
the respondent in a French court in Nantes321 (where it 
prevailed), and also in the Seoul District Court322 (where it 
did not). The panel noted that even if it were to accept the re-
filed complaint and order a transfer of the domain name, the 
order would be unnecessary or impossible to implement, 
given the Korean court’s disposition of the dispute.323  
Although there is no separate opinion, the text of the 
panel’s decision in Korean devotes a section entitled 
“opposing opinion” (반대의견 or bahn-deh-eui-gyun), which 
notes a dissenting view.324 This portion of the decision 
describes Panelist Nathalie Dreyfus’ statement that: the re-
filed complaint should be allowed in light of the new 
evidence of the respondent’s contract to sell the domain 
name; the domain name should be transferred to the 
complainant because the requisite elements are satisfied; the 





321 Id. (citing “Ordonnance de Refere Rendue Le 17 Mai 2001, Tribunal de 
Grande Instance de Nanterre (N°R.G.: 01/01497)”).  
322 Id. (citing Seoul D. Ct., jah 2001 kah-hahb 1625 (Sept. 26, 2001)). 
323 Id. In this discussion, the panel referred to and paraphrased 
paragraph 17 of the UDRP Rules. Id. n.8. 
324 Id.  
524 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
domain name was used for a pornographic website; and 
there was bad faith in selling the domain name to a third 
party.325   
The <france3.com> affair, which involved two UDRP 
proceedings, conflicting decisions from courts in two 
different countries, and international intrigue, is not a 
typical dispute over a domain name. The two panel 
decisions invite further discussion on several issues 
stemming from the UDRP process. First, there are many 
examples of disputes involving domain names that resort to 
sexually graphic and explicit websites. UDRP decisions have 
found that using a domain name for a site with 
pornographic content may not always be a right or 
legitimate interest in respect of the domain name,326 and also 
that such use is evidence of bad faith.327 Here, the domain 
name initially resolved to a site with pornographic pictures, 
which were removed and replaced with a message referring 
to a website relating to “sex solution.” Even if, arguably, a 
service that provides “adult information” relating to “sex 
solution” is a bona fide offering of services under paragraph 
4(c)(i), there is a question as to the distinction between such 
a service and pornographic material. 
The burden is on the complainant to prove the 
presence of all three elements. Although this burden is eased 
somewhat relating to the respondent’s right or interest in the 
                                                
 
 
325 Id.  
326 E.g., V&V Supremo Foods, Inc. v. pxlchk1@gmail.com, WIPO Case 
No. D2006-1373 (Jan. 22, 2007).  
327 E.g., id.; Coral Trademarks, Ltd. v. Eastern Net, Inc., WIPO Case No. 
D2000-1295 (Dec. 26, 2000); America Online, Inc. v. Viper, WIPO Case 
No. D2000-1198 (Nov. 28, 2000). 
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domain name, proving the respondent’s bad faith in many 
cases poses challenges. As noted above, the respondent’s 
knowledge of the complainant’s mark at the time of the 
domain name registration may be inferred, especially if the 
mark is well-known. The sole panelist in the <france3.com> 
proceeding was not convinced of the “FRANCE3” mark’s 
fame in Korea and appeared to accept the respondent’s 
argument that the domain name merely incorporated a 
generic or geographic term. The situation is problematic for 
holders of trademarks that do not have instant, worldwide 
recognition. The complainant is left to pose the question of 
the likelihood that an individual in Korea who desires to 
register a domain name for a pornographic site would 
choose “france3”328 (over “france1” or “france2,” for 
example) or the “france-” prefix (over “japan-,” “germany-,” 
or “switzerland-”), without having the complainant and its 
mark in mind. Perhaps to make a stronger case for bad faith 
– and specifically to establish the respondent’s knowledge of 
the complainant and its mark, as well as the respondent’s 
intent in choosing the domain name – the complainant 
would have benefitted from the judicial process seen in U.S. 
civil litigation.329 In contrast, the UDRP is a streamlined 
procedure to address cybersquatting, with no discovery, in-
                                                
 
 
328 Is there some significance to the number “3” for such a site?  
329 See, for example, Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. 
Supp. 198, 204 (D. Md. 1988), where the court, citing to various portions 
of the record, rejected the defendant chief executive officer’s testimony 
that his selection of “McSleep Inn” was not “an imitation of McDonald’s 
or that McDonald’s occurred to him at the time that he selected the name 
McSleep.”  
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person hearings, or cross-examination, and the three 
requisite elements of paragraph 4(a) govern.  
Many domain name disputes involve parties from 
different countries. The panelists appointed to decide the 
disputes also have nationality. They have two options in 
their decision making, which is of an all-or-nothing 
character: deny the complaint or order transfer of the 
domain name to the complainant. The instances where a 
panelist decides in favor of the party with the same 
nationality, whatever the facts of the case or the merit in the 
argument, will raise a human suspicion from the non-
prevailing party of national favoritism. The arbitral rules 
seek to avoid this situation by appointing a sole arbitrator or 
the chair of a panel (in those cases with a tribunal of three 
panelists) from a third, neutral country.330 There are 
examples of this practice in WIPO’s appointment of UDRP 
panelists as well,331 but the expedited schedule of an 
administrative proceeding332 poses challenges, in that 
qualifying panelists, especially those with the necessary 
language skills, may not be available.   
 With respect to the three-member panel decision in 
<france3.com>, in denying the complaint, the majority 
indicated that given the Korean court’s decision against the 
                                                
 
 
330 See supra text accompanying note 77.  
331 See infra text accompanying notes 376-77 & note 377. 
332 The UDRP Rules provide that for a proceeding with a sole panelist, 
the provider is to appoint a panelist within five days after receipt of the 
respondent’s response, or the date that the response is due. UDRP Rules, 
supra note 15, ¶ 6(b). Although the time frame for appointing panelists 
for a proceeding with a three-member panel is more relaxed, it is 
nevertheless an expedited schedule. Id. 
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complainant in its request for a transfer of the domain name, 
it would be pointless for the panel to decide the dispute 
under the Policy. The fact, as well as the content, of the 
dissent was indicated by the majority of the panel. The 
description of the dissenting view provided above is a 
summary of an English translation of a portion of the 
decision in Korean, which presumably is a translation of 
what the French dissenting panelist relayed in English to the 
two Korean panelists comprising the majority. This is a 
reality of the international dispute resolution tribunal, and 
there is always the possibility of some loss of meaning in 
translation. The dissenting view, as reported by the majority, 
does not mention the matter of the complainant’s purported 
involvement in the respondent’s contract for the sale of the 
domain name nor the Seoul District Court’s decision, two 
points on which the majority relied to reject the re-filed 
complaint. The lack of a separate opinion may also 
contribute to the view that the decision was unanimously 




                                                
 
 
333 WIPO’s notation of the case does not indicate a dissent. See Search 
WIPO Cases and WIPO Panel Decisions, supra note 26 (result for D2002-
1181). An epilogue: The respondent in the <france3.com> proceedings is 
no longer the named registrant of the domain name, nor is the domain 
name used for a pornographic or adult site. Currently, Internet users 
who resort to <france3.com> are re-directed to <france3.fr>, which 
displays a website in French text devoted to television broadcasting. The 
<france3.com> domain name is registered to “France Televisions,” based 
in Paris. See Whois france3.com, WHOIS, 
http://www.whois.com/whois/france3.com. 
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b.   <SAMCLUB.COM>  
 
The dispute over the domain name <samclub.com> 
was also the subject of two separate proceedings involving 
the same parties, the first decided by a sole panelist,334 and 
then after a re-filed complaint, by a three-member panel.335 
There, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the U.S.-based retailer that had 
rights in the mark “SAM’S CLUB”, challenged the Korean 
party’s registration and use of the domain name 
<samclub.com>. The sole panelist denied the complaint.336 
Eight months later, the complainant commenced another 
UDRP proceeding against the same respondent over the 
same domain name, and requested a three-member panel to 
decide the dispute. The panel unanimously agreed that the 
complaint presented a new dispute and that the tribunal had 
the authority to decide it. The panel denied the complaint by 
a majority vote.337 I was the dissenting panelist, and in an 
exercise of discretion, decline to offer an analysis of the 
pertinent issues in the decision. The <samclub.com> 
proceeding is included here for the sake of a complete 
database of the subject decisions. The reasons for my 
disagreement with the majority’s decision are set out in full 
in the dissenting opinion.338 Interested readers are invited to 
review the decision by the sole panelist, the majority 
                                                
 
 
334 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. iContents, WIPO Case No. D2005-0492 (June 
28, 2005) (sole panelist) [in Korean].  
335 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. iContents, WIPO Case No. D2006-0226 (June 
20, 2006) (three-member panel) [in Korean].  
336 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0492. 
337 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-0226.  
338 Id. (Lee, Pan., dissenting).  
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decision, and the dissenting opinion (or their translations), 
and reach their own conclusions about the proceedings in 
the context of this study.339   
  
i.   DISSENT FROM TRANSFER 
 
a.   <STX.COM>  
 
The complainant in STX LLC v. Yu nae ho,340 a leading 
manufacturer and distributor of sporting equipment and 
apparel, especially lacrosse and hockey equipment, used the 
mark “STX” for its products. STX products were sold in a 
number of countries, including Korea. On April 18, 2006, 
two weeks before the complaint was filed, STX LLC sent a 
cease and desist letter to the then registrant of the domain 
name <stx.com>, which resolved to a site that included links 
to the complainant’s competitors and “meta-tags such as 
‘STX lacrosse’ and ‘STX field hockey[].’”341 On April 19, the 
respondent, who had made a down payment of ₩9,000,000 
(approximately US$9,475, under the exchange rate at that 
time) five days prior, paid the rest of the sales price and took 
“assignment” of the domain name.342 On April 20, by when 
<whois.com> records indicated the change in the registrant, 
the complainant sent an email to the respondent attaching 
                                                
 
 
339 The domain name is still registered to the respondent; the domain 
name resolves to an active website. 
340 WIPO Case No. D2006-0567 (Aug. 14, 2006). 
341 Id. 
342 Id. This is the resulting figure using the currency converter for April 
13, 2006. YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-
converter (last visited May 24, 2016). 
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the complainant’s cease and desist letter to the previous 
registrant; the respondent did not respond. On May 4, the 
complainant commenced the UDRP proceeding. “Sometime 
later (the exact date is unknown),” the respondent replaced 
the content of the website previously described with an 
“under construction message.”343       
The panel unanimously decided that the domain 
name <stx.com> was confusingly similar to the “STX” mark 
in which the complainant had rights.344 The panel was also 
unanimous in deciding that the respondent did not have a 
right or legitimate interest in respect of the domain name.345 
The panel’s treatment of the bad faith element was more 
complex and divided. In summary, the majority of the panel 
– Presiding Panelist Lawrence K. Nodine and Panelist Sally 
M. Abel – determined that the respondent registered and 
used the domain name in bad faith “primarily because he 
did not discontinue his predecessor’s bad faith” until after 
the complaint was filed.346 
Elaborating, the majority stated that the active 
website was bad faith use in that the contents included 
advertisements for lacrosse and hockey products, links to the 
complainant’s competitors, and meta-tags that targeted the 
complainant. This was evidence that the respondent 
                                                
 
 
343 STX LLC, WIPO Case No. D2006-0567. 
344 Id. Indeed, the respondent conceded the point.  
345 Id. The panel stated that the respondent’s purported intention to use 
the <stx.com> domain name “for a website for Social Training for 
eXtreme People” was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
“demonstrable preparations to use . . . the domain name in connection 
with a bona fide offering of goods or services,” under UDRP ¶ 4(c)(i). Id. 
346 Id. 
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attempted to attract Internet users to the website by creating 
a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark, 
under paragraph 4(b)(iv).347 The majority of the panel also 
found bad faith registration of the domain name, for 
purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii). Initially, the majority 
explained that bad faith acquisition substitutes for bad faith 
registration. Here, bad faith was present in that, absent 
contrary evidence, the respondent was presumed to have 
knowledge of the offending contents of the website at the 
time he acquired the domain name.348  
The majority noted, in two separate footnotes, that the 
third panelist “does not join.”349 The dissenting opinion 
reads in full: “I respectfully dissent. In my view, the 
Complainant has failed to sustain its burden of proving that 
the Respondent registered (or acquired) and has used the 
disputed domain name in bad faith. I would therefore deny 
the Complaint.”350 We cannot know of the deliberations 
among the panel members in STX LLC regarding the bad 
faith element. The three panelists may well have vetted all 
aspects of the issue in full, with each panelist expounding 
her or his reasons; the majority may have re-cast its 
formulation of bad faith acquisition and bad faith use, in 
                                                
 
 
347 Id.  
348 Id.  
349 “Panelist David Sorkin does not join in the finding of bad faith 
registration.” Id. n.1. “Panelist David Sorkin does not join in this portion 
of the decision and would instead find that Complainant has not 
satisfied its burden to prove that Respondent Yu registered or acquired 
the disputed domain name in bad faith.” Id. n.2. Of note, the majority’s 
description refers only to registration or acquisition, not use.   
350 Id. (Sorkin, Pan., dissenting). 
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light of the dissenter’s concerns. This is known only to the 
panelists.  
As alluded to above, the bad faith element under 
paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy has been the subject of much 
discussion by panelists and commentators.351 The STX LLC 
decision contributes further. Note in the majority’s 
exposition, the references to the respondent’s responsibility, 
inferences, presumptions, coded and imputed knowledge, 
and rules: 
We . . . hold Respondent Yu responsible 
for the contents of the webpage as of the filing 
date of the UDRP Complaint. This rule is 
recognized where ownership does not change, 
i.e. a registrant may not escape bad faith 
inferences by deleting offending content from a 
webpage after an action is filed. . . .  
The rule should be no different merely 
because the Respondent acquired ownership 
shortly before, in this case two weeks prior to, 
the filing of the UDRP action. The status of the 
webpage on the date the UDRP action is filed 
controls the proceedings. . . . If he were acting 
in good faith, Respondent Yu should have 
taken down the offending webpage promptly 
after receiving the April 20 cease and desist e-
mail. . . .  
. . . The inferences that may be drawn 
from the content of the webpage should not 
                                                
 
 
351 See supra text accompanying notes 150-78 & note 156. 
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change where the registrant only recently 
acquired ownership of the page. 
. . . It is immaterial that the Respondent 
subsequently deleted offending content from 
the [webpage]. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he assignee of the disputed 
domain name in all likelihood had knowledge of 
the content of the webpage displayed on the 
acquired domain name at the time of 
acquisition. . . . Respondent Yu may fairly be 
presumed, therefore, to have had knowledge of, 
not only the hockey and lacrosse product 
emphasis and links that the appeared on the 
<stx.com> webpage, but also of the meta-tags 
that reveal use of the trademark STX (“stx 
lacrosse” and “stx field hockey”) in the meta-
tags. We find that it is more likely than not that 
these meta-tags were coded with knowledge of 
the Complainant’s trademark rights with 
respect to lacrosse and hockey products for the 
express purpose of attracting internet users 
looking for the Complainant’s STX products. . . 
. 
. . . [A]ny other rule would enable an 
accused cyber-pirate to avoid the UDRP by 
quick transfers. If it is fair to infer that the 
creator of the meta-tags was aware of the 
Complainant’s rights, then we must be 
permitted to apply the same inference to the 
conduct of an assignee who fails to take down 
the offending site after he acquires control of it 
and continues to publish the webpage after 
receiving notice of the Complainant’s rights. A 
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majority of the Panel would charge the 
Respondent with knowledge of the meta-tags that 
appear on the web-page he continued to 
broadcast and further charge him with awareness 
that these meta-tags revealed trademark usage 
of STX. 
. . . [T]he rule should be that one who 
acquires a webpage that has been used in bad 
faith assumes responsibility for the contents of 
that page if he continues to publish it after 
receiving notice of the Complainant’s rights. . . 
.352 
 
It is not clear from what, if any, of the above the 
dissenter was dissenting.  To be sure, the dissent of the 
thirty-eight words might have defenders, especially from 
those in arbitration circles.353 Nevertheless, the UDRP 
                                                
 
 
352 STX LLC, WIPO Case No. D2006-0567 (emphasis added). 
353 Given the conflicting views on the utility of a dissent in arbitration 
cases, some commentators urge that a dissenting opinion, if it must be 
filed at all, should be “short, polite and restrained.” REDFERN & HUNTER, 
supra note 250, at 392. In this regard, in my own travels, one well-known 
arbitrator, who indicated to me his opposition to dissenting opinions in 
arbitration matters, advised that if an arbitrator disagrees with the 
majority on the ultimate outcome of the award, “[h]e has two options. 
Refuse to sign the award, or just write, ‘I respectfully dissent.’” Another 
commentator, however, has cautioned against a dissent that is too brief 
to be helpful. “A perfunctory dissent will serve neither the institution of 
arbitration nor any of the parties. A responsibly formulated dissent is 
also required to encourage the majority to proper reconsideration of its 
award in the light of the dissent.” Hans Smit, Dissenting Opinions in 
Arbitration, 15 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 37, 41 (2004).   
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process benefits more when panel decisions are seen as a 
form of international common law (where persuasive 
precedents emerge after panel percolation), rather than as 
international commercial arbitration (which arguably 
emphasizes a decision for the dispute only).354 In all events, 
the legal commentary is taking note of dissenting opinions, 
and notable dissenters, in UDRP decisions.355   
 
b.   <ISCRUB.COM>  
 
The complainant in Esquire Innovations, Inc. v. [] 
Vertical Axis, Inc., was a U.S. company engaged “in the 
process of document creation, formatting, re-purposing, 
comparing, and the supply of metadata management 
                                                
 
 
354 Redfern and Hunter have noted that “the very purpose of an 
arbitration . . . is to arrive at a determinative decision. . . . It is that 
decision which matters; and it matters not as a guide to the opinions of a 
particular arbitrator, or as an indication of the future development of the 
law, but because it resolves the particular dispute that divides the 
parties, in the manner chosen by the parties, even if one of the arbitrators 
believes that decision to be wrong.” REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 250, 
at 392. Nevertheless, the notion of (non-binding) precedent in arbitration 
is receiving more attention. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: 
How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091 (2012). 
355 For example, Panelist M. Scott Donahey’s dissent in Guru Denim Inc. v. 
Ibrahim Ali Ibrahim Abu-Harb, WIPO Case No. D2013-1324 (Sept. 27, 
2013), was critically reviewed by a Harvard Law Review piece. Cyberlaw, 
supra note 34, at 2132-33. “Guru Denim is not a novel dissent for 
Donahey: for the past half-decade, he has consistently advocated for a 
unitary understanding of bad faith in the face of widespread acceptance 
of the conjunctive view.” Id. at 2133 (citing A. Nattermann v. Watson 
Pharm., Inc., WIPO Case No. D2010-0800 (Aug. 31, 2010) (Donahey, Pan., 
dissenting)).  
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software applications for the legal profession.”356 One of the 
complainant’s products, named Iscrub, was designed to 
remove metadata from documents.357 The complainant 
registered the “ISCRUB” mark with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office on July 26, 2005, over three years after the 
respondent, Vertical Axis, Inc., had registered the domain 
name <iscrub.com>, on November 8, 2001. The respondent 
stated in its response that the complainant did not have 
enforceable trademark rights under the UDRP “because its 
mark does not predate the domain name and the alleged 
date of first use of the mark is four months after the domain 
name was registered.”358 The respondent also requested a 
finding of reverse domain name hijacking. Five days after 
the response was filed, the complainant submitted a 
supplemental filing that contained new evidence that the 
first commercial use of the complainant’s “ISCRUB” mark 
occurred before the registration of disputed domain name. 
About four weeks later, WIPO appointed the panel, which 
issued a procedural order stating that the panel would 
consider the complainant’s supplemental filing, and 
allowing the respondent to file a reply. The respondent did 
so.359  
                                                
 
 
356 WIPO Case No. D2007-0856 (Oct. 5, 2007). For citation purposes, the 
identity shield service as a named respondent party is omitted.  
357 “Metadata is electronic text that has been removed from documents 
and other electronic records, but which has been left behind in the 
process of amending documents so that, unless removed by Iscrub or 
another process, it may still be detected.” Id. 
358 Id. 
359 Id.  
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Presiding Panelist, the Honorable Neil Anthony 
Brown QC,360 and Panelists David E. Sorkin and David H. 
Tatham comprised the three-member panel. Before turning 
to the merits, the panel discussed the matter of supplemental 
filings. Under the UDRP Rules,361 only the panel, in its 
discretion, may request further submissions, and parties 
may not do so without leave of the panel.362 A majority of 
the panel decided in the exercise of its discretion to consider 
supplemental filings: 
In this case, the Complainant’s Supplemental 
Filing was timely filed, as it was lodged only 7 
days after the Response and, as the 
Complainant says, it has not delayed the 
proceedings as it was filed simultaneously 
with its nomination of Panelists. Therefore, on 
the strength of this, and in the light of the 
above Decisions,[363] which give to a panel the 
                                                
 
 
360 The presentation of the presiding panelist’s title and name appears 
this way, and differs from that seen in Witmer Pub. Safety Grp. Inc. v. 
Kwang pyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2011-0075 (Mar. 31, 2011). Panelist 
Brown’s separate opinion therein is discussed supra text accompanying 
notes 302-05. 
361 “Further Statements[.] In addition to the complaint and the response, 
the Panel may request, in its sole discretion, further statements or 
documents from either of the Parties.” UDRP Rules, supra note 15, ¶ 12.  
362 Within the 58 decisions, there are examples of the panel exercising its 
discretion and reaching different results. Deutsche Lufthansa AG v. [] 
Kwangpyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2013-1844 (Jan. 22, 2014) (admitting 
supplemental filing); Dig. Overture Inc. v. Chris Bradfield/GoPets Ltd., 
WIPO Case No. D2008-0091 (Apr. 23, 2008) (declining to admit 
supplemental filing).  
363 The majority previously cited and quoted from a number of WIPO-
administered decisions, including principally, Deutsche Börse AG v. 
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flexibility to admit new evidence that was not 
previously available, a majority of the Panel in 
this case is prepared to take the Complainant’s 
Supplemental Filing into account.364  
 
Ultimately, the majority concluded that the evidence 
submitted by the complainant in its supplemental filing was 
“pivotal” to the resolution of the case, and that the 
respondent availed itself of the opportunity to reply, “so no 
injustice can be done to the Respondent.”365 “Indeed,” the 
majority noted, “the Panel cannot but be assisted by now 
having before it all of the material that each side wishes to 
submit.”366 Turning to the merits, the majority concluded 
that the three elements of paragraph 4(a) were satisfied. 
With respect to the bad faith element, the majority found 
that the respondent’s activities were covered under three of 
the examples provided in paragraph 4(b): (i), (ii), and (iv).367  
Panelist Sorkin dissented. He stated that while he 
“agree[d] with many of the majority’s findings,” the 
complainant did not meet its burden of proof on bad faith 
registration, even if the complainant’s supplemental filing 
was considered.368 The panelist did not further elaborate on 
                                                                                                         
 
 
Ramon Campos Munoz, WIPO Case No. D2005-0346 (May 23, 2005) (citing 
Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Boris Kerpacev, WIPO Case No. D2000-1571 
(June 17, 2001)).  




368 Id. (Sorkin, Pan., dissenting). 
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his views regarding the majority’s disposition of the bad 
faith element. “More importantly,” he wrote, “I believe that 
the Panel should not consider the parties’ supplemental 
filings . . . .”369 The dissent urged that the panel’s discretion 
provided for in the UDRP Rules “ought not be exercised 
lightly. As the majority acknowledges, additional 
submissions should be considered only in exceptional 
circumstances . . . .”370 To the dissent, the case did not 
present the requisite circumstances to warrant an exception 
to the general rule.  
Panelist Sorkin also stated that “based upon the 
remaining information before the Panel, I would find that 
the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an 
abuse of this administrative proceeding.”371 He further 
wrote:  
The Complaint alleges that Respondent 
registered the disputed domain name in bad 
faith in 2001, intending to benefit from a 
trademark that did not even exist until 
Complainant adopted and began using it in 
2002. In my view, the filing of such an 
obviously frivolous claim represents an abuse 
of the UDRP process and warrants a finding 
that the complaint was brought in bad faith, in 
an attempt at reverse domain name hijacking. . 
. .[372] 






372 Id. (citing Datalyst LLC v. Estes, NAF Case No. FA954109 (May 9, 
2007); Protosoftware, Inc. v. Vertical Axis, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2006-
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The fact that Complainant later 
discovered that it had been mistaken about the 
age of its claimed common-law trademark 
rights does not alter this conclusion. Had 
Complainant not elected to abuse the UDRP 
process by filing a complaint that it knew or 
should have known to be frivolous, it would 
later have been in a position to file a 
nonfrivolous complaint (and indeed, were we 
to dismiss the present matter, Complainant 
would remain free to initiate a second UDRP 
proceeding or pursue a trademark claim in 
court).373 
 
The Esquire Innovations, Inc. proceeding offers a vivid 
example of how individual panelists may take profoundly 
different positions on precisely the same issue, which may in 
turn effect different outcomes for the parties. Both the 
majority and the dissent quoted paragraph 12 of the UDRP 
Rules to emphasize the panel’s discretion in allowing 
additional party submissions. Discretion was in the eye of 
the beholder. In addition, both referred to the same 
examples of “exceptional circumstances” that allow for 
                                                                                                         
 
 
0905 (Oct. 10, 2006); Mess Enters. v. Scott Enters., WIPO Case No. D2004-
0964 (Jan. 25, 2005); carsales.com.au Ltd. v. Flanders, WIPO Case No. 
D2004-0047 (Apr. 8, 2004); NetDeposit, Inc. v. NetDeposit.com, WIPO 
Case No. D2003-0365 (July 22, 2003)). 
373 Id. 
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consideration of supplemental filings.374 Operating under 
the same standards, the majority and the dissent reached 
different results. Based on the respective determinations 
regarding the supplemental filings, the majority continued 
to reach a decision ordering the transfer of the domain name, 
while the dissent would have issued a finding of reverse 
domain name hijacking. Perhaps Esquire Innovations, Inc. 
might give pause to UDRP parties to consider requesting 
three-member panels toward a collective decision making 
process, given that much of the panelist’s work is a matter of 
individual discretion.  
As a prelude to the last two dissenting opinions, in 
the international arbitration setting, when the parties are 
nationals of two different countries, the three-member 
tribunal is sometimes comprised of: one arbitrator each from 
the country of the respective parties (often party-nominated 
arbitrators); and the chair or presiding arbitrator from a 
third, neutral country.375 Fifty-six of the 58 UDRP decisions 
                                                
 
 
374 Id. (majority decision) (quoting Deutsche Börse AG v. Ramon Campos 
Munoz, WIPO Case No. D2005-0346 (May 23, 2005) (“As a rule, 
additional evidence or submissions should only be admitted in 
exceptional circumstances, such as when additional submissions are 
necessary to reply to the finding of newly discovered evidence not 
reasonably available to the submitting party at the time of its initial 
submission or to rebut arguments by the respondent that the 
complainant could not reasonably have anticipated.”)); id. (Sorkin, Pan., 
dissenting) (paraphrasing quotation). 
375 One commentator explains thus: 
In a dispute between say an Indonesian party and an 
Australian party there may well be an apprehension of 
unfairness if the dispute is litigated before an Indonesian 
or Australian court. The fact that the adjudicator 
possesses the nationality of one of the parties may well 
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herein involve a dispute between a Korean and a non-
Korean party.376 Nine of these fifty-six see a panel with a 
Korean panelist, a non-Korean panelist with the same 
nationality as the non-Korean party in the dispute, and the 
presiding panelist of a third country.377 Seven of these nine 
                                                                                                         
 
 
be regarded as unfair or at least undesirable. It is here 
that arbitration has the distinct advantage. Usually an 
international arbitrator will not hold the nationality of 
either of the disputant parties. This is the common case 
if there is one arbitrator. In the case of a tribunal of three 
arbitrators, the chairman will be neutral though each of 
the party-appointed arbitrators may well bear the 
nationality of the appointing party. 
Michael Pryles, Assessing Dispute Resolution Procedures, 7 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 267, 280 (1996). 
376 Of the said fifty-six decisions, all but three involve a non-Korean 
complainant against a Korean respondent. The three with the Korean 
complainant and a non-Korean respondent are: Samsung Networks Co. v. 
SuperVirtualOffice Corp., WIPO Case No. DVE2010-0001 (May 10, 2010); 
Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Pimser Elecs. Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2009-1630 (Feb. 
16, 2010); and Topfield Co. v. Jai Kemp & Dig. Prods. Grp. Pty Ltd., WIPO 
Case No. DAU2008-0002 (Apr. 21, 2008). Two other decisions involve a 
Korean complainant versus a respondent whose listed address is in the 
U.S., but according to the decisions, the respondent had significant ties to 
Korea. Orion Corp. v. Jang, Dong, WIPO Case No. D2012-2184 (Feb. 7, 
2013) (stating that respondent “spent most of its life in the Republic of 
Korea”); NHN Corp. v. NHN Corp., WIPO Case No. D2003-0939 (Feb. 
27, 2004) (stating that president of respondent was “of Korean origin, 
[and] understand[s] the Korean language”). 
377 For these nine decisions, the nationality of the three panelists is 
indicated in the following list. Korea appears first if the complainant was 
a Korean party, and last if it was the respondent; the nationality of the 
presiding panelist is indicated in the middle. JJGC Industria E Comercio 
de Materiais Dentarios S.A. v. Yun-Ki Kim, WIPO Case No. D2013-1838 
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resulted in unanimous panel decisions;378 dissents were filed 
in the other two. 
In both of the decisions with a dissenting opinion, the 
complainant was Amazon.com, the U.S. company that 
operates “an Internet website <amazon.com> that permits 
persons around the world to purchase books and other 
merchandise including motor vehicles on-line,”379 and is 
“one of the most famous trading names on the internet and 
                                                                                                         
 
 
(Dec. 20, 2013) (Brazil-U.S.-Korea); UTV Ltd. v. Unitedeurope 
Consulting, Kwang Pyo Kim, WIPO Case No. D2011-2293 (Mar. 5, 2012) 
(Australia & Great Britain-Netherlands-Korea); United Airlines, Inc. v. 
United Airline Dot.Com, WIPO Case No. D2002-0835 (Nov. 9, 2002) 
(U.S.-India-Korea); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazonpic, WIPO Case No. 
D2002-0330 (July 22, 2002) (U.S.-Great Britain-Korea); VoiceStream 
Wireless Corp. v. Hanjin Ko, WIPO Case No. D2001-1411 (Australia-
Great Britain-Korea); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazoninsu Co., WIPO Case 
No. D2001-1275 (Dec. 20, 2001) (U.S.-New Zealand-Korea); Amazon.com, 
Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Dec. 20, 2001) (U.S.-
New Zealand-Korea); SEMATECH, Inc. v. Lee Hyunggyu, WIPO Case 
No. D2001-0870 (Nov. 26, 2001) (U.S.-Australia-Korea); SMS Demag AG 
v. Seung Gon, Kim, WIPO Case No. D2000-1434 (Jan. 19, 2001) 
(Germany-New Zealand-Korea). 
In a tenth case, Banco Itau S.A. v. Webmedia, the complainant was 
a national of Brazil; the respondent, a national of Korea. The panelists 
were from Brazil, Korea, and Great Britain. The presiding panelist was 
Korean. WIPO Case No. D2008-0531 (July 18, 2008). 
378 JJGC Industria E Comercio de Materiais Dentarios S.A., WIPO Case No. 
D2013-1838 (complaint denied); UTV Limited, WIPO Case No. D2011-
2293 (complaint denied); United Airlines, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2002-
0835 (transfer); VoiceStream Wireless Corp., WIPO Case No. D2001-1411 
(transfer); Amazoninsu Co., WIPO Case No. D2001-1275 (transfer); 
SEMATECH, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0870 (transfer); SMS Demag AG, 
WIPO Case No. D2000-1434 (transfer). 
379 Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276. 
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has expanded its range of products to include . . . video 
tapes and DVDs.”380 The complainant had registrations of 
the “AMAZON.COM” mark in seventy countries, including 
Korea.381   
 
c.   <AMAZONCAR.COM>; <AMAZONECAR.COM>  
 
In Amazon.com, Inc. v. Sung Hee Cho,382 we return to 
the decision that opened this article. Amazon.com objected 
to the Korean respondent’s registration of the domain names 
<amazoncar.com> (which was used for “a Korean language 
website that offers to rent or lease Hyundai & Kia 
automobiles”) and <amazonecar.com> (which did not 
resolve to a website).383 The respondent did not file a 
response. The panel – comprised of M. Scott Donahey (U.S.), 
the Honorable Sir Ian Barker QC (New Zealand) as the 
presiding panelist, and Boh Young Hwang (Korea) – 
unanimously determined that the domain names were 
confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark and that the 
respondent had no right or legitimate interest in the domain 
name.384 Regarding the bad faith element, “in the view of the 
majority of the Panel[,]  
it strains belief that the Respondent did not 
know of the Complainant’s mark and 
                                                
 
 
380 Amazonpic, WIPO Case No. D2002-0330. 
381 Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276. Here, the panel also noted 
that “[s]tudies by Internet monitors have identified the <amazon.com> 
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reputation at the time of registration. The 
inference that there has been a crude attempt 
by the Respondent to capitalize on the 
Complainant’s reputation as a worldwide 
vendor on the Internet is inescapable. It is thus 
easy to infer that the Respondent in bad faith is 
attempting to divert to his website Internet 
users who may think the website has some 
connection with the Complainant.385 
 
Panelist Hwang386 dissented. Although she agreed 
with the majority on the first two elements of paragraph 
4(a), she stated that the complainant failed to prove that the 
domain names were registered and used in bad faith, and 
thus would have denied the complaint.387 The crux of the 
dissenting view appears to be that even though the 
complainant’s trademark was “famous worldwide,” 
especially for its business of Internet book sales, there was 
no evidence that the mark was well-known for car-related 
products or services.388 Panelist Hwang noted that the 
respondent’s website for <amazoncar.com> was used only 
for a car-rental service and presented only “in the local 
language of the country which the Respondent is targeting 
                                                
 
 
385 Id.  
386 Until her untimely passing in 2009, Panelist Hwang was the most 
prolific Korean author of WIPO-administered UDRP decisions.  
387 Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Hwang, Pan., dissenting). 
388 Id. Panelist Hwang also noted the lack of evidence to show the 
complainant’s trademark or service rights relating to such car products 
or car rental services, especially in Korea. Id.   
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for its business purposes.”389 In contrast to the majority’s 
conclusion on the respondent’s intent in selecting the 
domain name, the dissent expressed a fundamentally 
different view: “Except for the Complainant’s use of the 
word ‘amazoncar’, the reiteration of its domain name and its 
trade name, nowhere in the Complaint is any indication that 
the Respondent registered or is using the domain names and 
the word ‘amazon’ for the purpose of capitalizing on the 
Complainant’s reputation.”390  
                                                
 
 
389 Id. She also observed that the complainant’s website for its car-dealing 
business was maintained under another domain name, 
<carsdirect.com>, “although it still represents <amazon.com> as its 
trademark.” Id.   
390 Id. Of interest here is the decision in another proceeding in which 
Amazon.com was the complainant, but against a different named 
respondent. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazoninsu Co., WIPO Case No. 
D2001-1275 (Dec. 20, 2001). The decision in Amazoninsu Co. was issued 
on the same date as that in Sung Hee Cho, and by the same panel that 
decided Sung Hee Cho – Panelist Donahey, Presiding Panelist Barker, and 
Panelist Hwang. Id.; Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276. In 
Amazoninsu Co., the respondent registered the domain name 
<amazon119.com>, and used it “for a Korean language website that 
offers automobile insurance.” Amazoninsu Co., WIPO Case No. D2001-
1275. There, the panel unanimously determined that the complainant 
successfully proved the requisite elements of paragraph 4(a) of the 
Policy, and ordered the transfer of the domain name. Id. The panel’s 
language in Amazoninsu.com (<amazon119.com>) describing the 
complainant and in disposing of each of the three elements is virtually 
identical to the corresponding text seen in Sung Hee Cho 
(<amazoncar.com>). Amazoninsu.com, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276; Sung 
Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276. In Sung Hee Cho, regarding the bad 
faith element, the majority stated:  
it strains belief that the Respondent did not know of the 
Complainant’s mark and reputation at the time of 
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In urging that the complainant should be required to 
present “more concrete evidence of bad faith,” Hwang 
referred to the geographic and generic nature of the domain 
name: “The name ‘Amazon’ is the name of the famous river 
which runs through the South American Continent and it is 
within the general knowledge of the public”; and “[t]he term 
‘car’ refers to a general commodity used in our everyday life 
which is the subject of trade in various transactions 
worldwide.”391 This point was also made by the dissenter in 
the next decision. 
 
d.   <AMAZONPIC.COM>  
 
In Amazon.com, Inc. v. Amazonpic,392 the Korean 
respondent registered the domain name <amazonpic.com>, 
which resolved to a website used for the respondent’s 
business of selling DVDs. The panel was comprised of David 
Plant (U.S.), Presiding Panelist Tony Willoughby (Great 
Britain), and Dr. Jisuk Woo (Korea). Regarding the first 
                                                                                                         
 
 
registration. The inference that there has been a crude 
attempt by the Respondent to capitalize on the 
Complainant’s reputation as a worldwide vendor on the 
Internet is inescapable. It is thus easy to infer that the 
Respondent in bad faith is attempting to divert to his website 
Internet users who may think the website has some connection 
with the Complainant. 
Id. (emphasis added). In Amazoninsu.com, the italicized text in the 
passage above was omitted. Amazoninsu.com, WIPO Case No. D2001-
1275. There was no dissent from Panelist Hwang in the 
<amazon119.com> decision. Id. 
391 Sung Hee Cho, WIPO Case No. D2001-1276 (Hwang, Pan., dissenting). 
392 WIPO Case No. D2002-0330 (July 22, 2002). 
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element of identical or confusing similarity, the panel, rather 
than resorting to a simple, objective comparison of the mark 
and the domain name,393 instead adopted the formula 
advanced by the complainant, namely, that “confusing 
similarity turns on use, similarity of the marks and terms in 
question, similarity of products and services, similarity of 
users and similarity of channels of distribution.”394 The 
majority concluded that all of these factors were present, but 
noted that confusing similarity would be in question and the 
complainant’s case would fail if few Korean Internet users 
had knowledge of the complainant.395 That was not the case 
here, per the majority, because “Amazon.com is so famous 
that there must be a risk that a not insubstantial number of 
internet users in Korea will believe as a result of the 
similarities between the Complainant’s trade mark and the 
Domain Name that the businesses associated with each are 
in some way related.”396  
 Regarding the respondent’s right or legitimate 
interest in the domain name, the majority stated that the 
complainant not only made its prima facie case, but also 
countered anticipated arguments that the respondent might 
raise to demonstrate a right or legitimate interest under 
paragraph 4(b) of the Policy. The burden shifting to the 
respondent, the majority noted that the respondent did “not 
seek to answer any of the Complainant’s allegations. Indeed, 
and most significantly of all, it does not deny the allegation 
                                                
 
 
393 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
394 Amazonpic, WIPO Case No. D2002-0330. 
395 Id.  
396 Id.  
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that when it registered the Domain Name it had the 
Complainant’s name and trade mark in mind.”397 Still under 
the heading of the respondent’s right or interest in the 
domain name, the majority opined that when the respondent 
registered the domain name, it was “well aware of the fame 
of the Complaint.”398 The majority concluded that it was 
“inconceivable that the Respondent did not register the 
Domain Name with the Complainant’s name and trade mark 
in mind and in the hope and expectation that it would lead 
to a commercial benefit for the Respondent.”399 Finally, the 
majority found that the “Domain Name was registered and . 
. . used in bad faith within the meaning of paragraphs 
4(a)(iii) and 4(b)(iv) of the Policy,” in that “the Respondent’s 
intention was to mislead internet users and thereby derive a 
commercial benefit from being seen to be associated in some 
way with the Complainant.”400 
Dr. Woo dissented: “In my opinion, the Complainant 
has proved none of the three elements of the Policy 
paragraph 4(a).”401 On the first element, she stated, “It is 
difficult for me to be convinced that the Domain Name 
<amazonpic.com> is confusingly similar to the 
Complainant’s trademark AMAZON.COM. Although 
<amazonpic.com> and AMAZON.COM may look similar 
literally, ‘amazon’ is a generic name that not only means a 
river but also female warrior or tall, vigorous woman . . . 
                                                
 
 
397 Id.  
398 Id.  
399 Id.  
400 Id. 
401 Id. (Woo, Pan., dissenting).  
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.”402 The dissent also questioned whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support similarity of use, products and 
services, users, and channels of distribution. Moreover, 
Panelist Woo disagreed with the majority’s view that 
“Amazon.com is so famous that there must be a risk of 
confusion.”403  
The dissenting opinion also stated that the 
respondent demonstrated its right and legitimate interest in 
the domain name under paragraph 4(c)(i) by registering the 
corporate name “amazonpicture”, operating a multimedia 
shopping mall, and registering and using the domain name 
<amazonpic.com>, which, along with <amazonpic.co.kr>, 
was “quite naturally wanted and obtained by the 
Respondent, given its company name.”404 But in doing so, 
the dissent did not address a matter included in the factual 
background portion of the decision, namely, that the 
respondent did not commence its business until after it 
registered the domain name.405 As noted above, the majority 
stated that it was “inconceivable” that the respondent did 
                                                
 
 
402 Id. (citation omitted).  
403 Id.  
404 Id.  
405 See id. (“4. Factual Background”). Indeed, the respondent’s response, 
the substance of which the decision quotes in full, includes the 
statement, “We . . . have been running a commercial shopping mall 
business based on a registered internet domain of <amazonpic.com> in 
Korea.” Id. (“5. Parties’ Contentions.” “B. Respondent”) (emphasis 
added). The response also stated that the respondent “legally registered 
a corporation name of amazonpicture and its trademark . . . and 
successfully received a trademark registration,” but did not state when. 
Id.  
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not register the domain name with the complainant and its 
mark in mind.406   
Panelist Woo characterized the majority’s decision 
regarding the bad faith element as “the most 
problematic.”407 Initially, she offered that there was no 
evidence of bad faith examples under paragraph 4(b)(i)-(iii). 
Urging that there was also no evidence that the respondent 
intentionally attempted to attract Internet visitors to the 
respondent’s website by creating a likelihood of confusion 
with the complainant’s mark, under paragraph 4(b)(iv), the 
dissent stated,  
Most of the users of the respondent’s web site 
seem to be Koreans and my guess is that they 
would not consider AMAZON.COM so much 
to be a seller of movies and other multimedia 
products as the Complainant argues. 
AMAZON.COM seems to be primarily 
considered a book-seller in Korea. To what 
extent AMAZON.COM is considered a seller of 
movies and other products, and whether 
Koreans would be confused by this Domain 
Name and think that it is affiliated to 
AMAZON.COM is a question that the 
Complainant must have shown, but failed.408 
 
This portion of the dissent, which is reminiscent of 
Panelist Hwang’s dissent in Sung Hee Cho, posits that even 
though the complainant’s “AMAZON.COM” mark may be 




407 Id. (Woo, Pan., dissenting). 
408 Id.  
552 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
 
well-known for online book sales, confusion can and should 
not be assumed when the mark or a similar rendition is used 
for movies or DVDs (<amazonpic.com>). Panelist Woo 
warned of the “quite serious and negative policy 
implications” of the majority decision, which “implies that 
no other entity could register any domain name that 
includes <amazon.com> because it is a trademark. This 
would result in granting too much right to the Complainant, 
preventing all the others from using otherwise available 
domain names, and protecting the status quo too 
strongly.”409 
With the dissenting views in the above two 
Amazon.com decisions in mind, two hypotheticals are 
offered for consideration. Assume that an individual, a 
resident of the U.S., avers in a sworn affidavit that her first 
name is Samantha, and that she previously performed as a 
singer and band member at local events near her residence. 
She begins a new business relating to the manufacture, 
distribution, and sale of intimate apparel, and to this end, 
registers the domain name <samsunglingerie.com>. Or the 
individual is Samuel, also a former singer, who registers 
<samsungjockstraps.com>,410 which resolves to a website for 
men’s sporting equipment. Assume also that a Korean 
company, claiming rights in a mark identical to the term 
preceding the generic name of the product that appears in 
both domain names, protests that Samuel and Samantha 
have engaged in cybersquatting, abusively registering and 
                                                
 
 
409 Id.  
410 As of this writing, according to the <whois.com> database, the two 
hypothetical domain names are available. 
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using the domain names, in violation of the company’s 
purported trademark rights. The Korean party files a UDRP 
complaint with WIPO.  
The Policy and the UDRP Rules govern. The 
appointed panel, at its discretion, may refer to prior 
decisions (and separate opinions) for guidance. In order for 
the complainant to win transfer of each domain name from 
the respondent, it must demonstrate that: 
Ø   the domain name (<samsunglingerie.com> and 
<samsungjockstraps.com>) is identical or 
confusingly similar to a mark in which the 
complainant has rights (say, “SAMSUNG”);  
Ø   the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests 
in respect of the domain name;411 and  
Ø   the domain name has been registered and is being 
used in bad faith.  
 
Regarding the bad faith element, and the requisite 
component of the respondent’s knowledge of the 
complainant at the time of the registration of the domain 
name, a panel may well declare that it “strains belief” or that 
it is “inconceivable” that the respondent did not know of the 
complainant and its trademark. But one wonders if the 
views expressed in the dissenting opinions in the 
Amazon.com cases, especially those relating to the scope of 
products for which the mark enjoys fame and reputation, 
should be applied. That is, if it is true that SAMSUNG is 
                                                
 
 
411 Here, the panel would have to address the respondent’s likely 
averment that “sam” refers to her or his first name, by which she or he 
has always been known, and “sung” is the past participle of a generic 
term that indicates a previous hobby of the respondent. 
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well-known worldwide for electronic products, but not for 
intimate apparel or men’s athletic equipment, and if the 
respondent’s website is limited to those respective products, 
should the panel determine that the respondent did not 
attempt to attract Internet users to its website by creating a 
likelihood of confusion? 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy provides for a method of resolving a dispute between 
a registrant of a domain name and a trademark holder who 
alleges cybersquatting. The method is an alternative to an 
action in the courts, which may not be desirable in disputes 
involving the Internet and parties from different countries. 
The UDRP process stands in contrast to traditional 
arbitration, but borrows much from the arbitration method, 
especially arbitration in the international context. The World 
Intellectual Property Organization, a major dispute 
resolution service provider of UDRP proceedings, 
administered the fifty-eight cases involving Korean parties 
that are the focus of this article. The proceedings led to 
administrative panel decisions by three-member panels. The 
panel decisions as a group shed light on the interpretation 
and application of key provisions of the Policy that govern 
in the resolution of disputes over domain names. Some of 
the 58 decisions include separate and dissenting views on 
issues relating to the language of the proceeding, reverse 
domain name hijacking, the appropriate timing of the 
complainant’s trademark rights, panel discretion regarding 
procedural issues, and the multifaceted bad faith element 
under paragraph 4. These decisions (and the views therein) 
assist parties and panelists to understand the application of 
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the Policy. The 58 decisions may also contribute to a 
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APPENDIXA 
                                                
 
 
a The nationality of each complainant and respondent is based on 
its listed address on the panel’s published decision. The nationality 
of the panelist is taken from his or her individual profile on 
WIPO’s Internet site, WIPO Domain Name Panelists, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/panel/panelists.html, or 
where it is not available, from a search link on WIPO’s main 
website, http://www.wipo.int, or a search on the Internet. Some 
panelists are deceased. Where panelists declared multiple 
nationalities, they are indicated in the order listed, and by “/” 
separating the nationalities. Where the panelist’s nationality differs 
from his or her listed address, the address is indicated second, 
following “;”. Two U.S.-based panelists of Korean national origin 
who declared American nationality are indicated as “USA, ROK.” 
Three-letter abbreviations are used to indicate nationality, using a 
list by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Moving 
Forward: 2011 Annual Report, IOC 94-95, 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfiles/Olym
pic_Solidarity/2011_report_Moving_Forward.pdf. 
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b If a privacy or identity shield service is included as a named 
respondent party, it is omitted. The respondent’s nationality is 
indicated only if it is not Korea. 
c The presiding panelist is listed first. Titles of panelists (e.g., 
“Honorable,” “Q.C.,” “Esq.”) as indicated in the decisions are not 
included here. “Jong, S.” and “Jung, S.” are the same panelist. For 
this panelist, “Jong” appears as the surname in decisions in 
English; “Jung” appears as the surname on the panelist’s individual 
profile on WIPO’s Internet site. This Article’s author is indicated 
by “Lee, I.”  
d The language of the decision is indicated if it is not English. Any 
separate and dissenting opinions are noted. 
 Case No. Complainant Respondentb Domain 
name(s) 
Decision Panelistsc Commentsd 




mysony.com Transfer Barker, I. (NZL) 
Christie, A. (AUS) 
Wilson, R. (AUS) 
 
2 D2000-1074 Sony Kabushiki 
Kaisha (JPN) 
sony.net sony.net Transfer Willoughby, T. 
(GBR) 
Carabelli, A. (ITA)  
Lee, M. (KOR) 
 









Barker, I. (NZL) 
Hoeren, T. (GER) 
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Lee, M. (KOR) 




Decision Panelists Comments 










Hunter, D. (AUS; USA) 
Lackert, C. (USA) 
Sorkin, D. (USA) 
 








Transfer Jong, S. (KOR) 
Hwang, B. (KOR) 
Michaelson, P. (USA) 
 




sematech.com Transfer Bennett, A. (AUS) 
Chang, M. (KOR) 















Barker, I. (NZL) 
Donahey, M. (USA) 















Barker, I. (NZL) 
Donahey, M. (USA) 
Hwang, B. (KOR) 
Dissent by 
Hwang 




Hanjin Ko  voicestream.or
g 
Transfer Perkins D. (UK) 
Hunter, D. (AUS; USA) 
Song, S. (KOR) 
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10 D2002-0330 Amazon.com





Willoughby, T. (GBR) 
Plant, D. (USA) 














experian.net Transfer Lee, M. (KOR) 
Hunter, D. (AUS; 
USA) 
Woo, J. (KOR) 







carfax.net  Transfer Anand, P. (IND) 
Hwang, B. (KOR) 










unitedairline.com  Transfer Anand, P. (IND) 
Hwang, B. (KOR) 









france3.com Denied Jung, S. (KOR) 
Dreyfus, N. (FRA) 
Woo, J. (KOR) 
Decision in Korean; 
dissenting opinion 










maxell.net Transfer Jung, S. (KOR) 
Hwang, B. (KOR) 
Lee, M. (KOR) 
Decision in Korean 








(JPN) & Minolta 
Kabushiki Kaisha 
(JPN)  






Lee, M. (KOR) 
Limbury, A. 
(GBR/AUS) 
Park, H. (KOR; 
USA) 
Decision in Korean 









Transfer Chang, M. (KOR) 
Bensoussan, A. (FRA) 






















, Inc. (USA) 
Kim Yoon-Jo  amazonfire.com Transfer Pinansky, T. (USA; 
KOR) 
Chang, M. (KOR) 














Park, H. (KOR; USA) 
Hwang, B. (KOR) 











nhn.com  Transfer Willoughby, T. (GBR) 
Abel, S. (USA) 
*President of 
Respondent is of 
Korean origin 
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Network 
(USA)* 






Kim Min-Kouk  weddingritz.com. Transfer Nitter, P. (NOR) 
Jong, S. (KOR) 
Thorne, C. (GBR) 
 








NBC Universal, Inc. 
(USA) & Universal City 
Studios LLLP (USA) 
Junak Kwon  nbcuniversal.com  Transfer Hwang, B. 
(KOR) 
Barker, I. (NZL) 










Minka Lighting, Inc. 
d/b/a Minka Group 
(USA) 
Lee Wongi  
 

































Seo, I. (US; 
KOR) 






















Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
(USA)  
iContents  samclub.com  Denied 
(2-1) 



























Jet Marques (FRA) Vertical Axis, 
Inc. 
jettour.com  Denied Smith, W. (AUS) 
Gautier, P. 
(FRA) 





STX LLC (USA) Yu nae ho & 
Jinsu Kim  




Abel, S. (USA) 
Sorkin, D. (USA) 
Dissent by 
Sorkin 
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Jong, S. (KOR) 
Li, Y. (CHN) 
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 Case No. Complainant Respondent Domain names Decision Panelists Comments 
35 D2006-1446 Chivas 
Brothers 






Transfer Pinansky, T. (USA; KOR) 
Gold, A. (GBR) 
Lee, I. (KOR/USA) 
 
 




hsm.com  Denied 
 
Barker, J. (AUS/GBR) 
Larus, C. (USA) 
Sorkin, D. (USA) 
 








Blackmer, W. (USA) 
Hines, P. (USA) 
Sorkin, D. (USA) 
 
38 D2007-0535 IFIL S.p.A 
(ITA) 
Han Jin Go ifil.com  Transfer Pinansky, T. (USA; KOR) 
Barbero, L. (ITA) 
Cho, J. (KOR) 
 
 















Turner, J. (GBR) 
Johnson, C. (USA) 
Sorkin, D. (USA) 
 
 





iscrub.com  Transfer 
(2-1) 
Brown, N. (AUS/GBR) 
Sorkin, D. (USA) 
Dissent by 
Sorkin 
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Tatham, D. (GBR) 
 Case 
No. 
Complainant Respondent Domain 
names 









herts.com  Transfer Barker, J. (AUS/GBR) 
Blackmer, W. (USA) 











mornay.com  Denied Kim, G. (USA, KOR) 
Jong, S. (KOR) 









GoPets Ltd.  
 
gopets.net  Denied &  
RDNH (2-1 
on RDNH) 
Barker, J. (AUS/GBR) 
Bernstein, D. (USA) 











Banco Itau S.A. 
(BRA) 
Webmedia itau.net Transfer Hwang, B. (KOR) 
Loureiro Oliveira, A. (BRA) 











Transfer Lee, I. (KOR/USA) 
Nahm, H. (KOR) 










Transfer Choi, C. (KOR) 
Cho, J. (KOR) 
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Argy, P. (AUS) 
Rothnie, W. (AUS) 
 
48 D2009-0239 Reckitt 
Benckiser 
Plc (GBR) 
Eunsook Wi  rb.net  Denied 
 
Joppich, B. (GER) 
Abbott, F. (USA) 
Bridgeman, J. (IRL) 
 
 













Samaras, H. (USA) 
Lee, D. (KOR) 














Transfer O’Farrell, M. (ARG) 













firestore.com Denied Kennedy, G. (IRL; HKG) 





(JPN)  Dogauchi, M. (JPN) 
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Inc. 
(USA) 
 Brown, N. (AUS/GBR) in part by 
Brown 






knowland.com  Transfer Park, A. (USA, KOR) 
Chang, M. (KOR) 
Lee, I. (KOR/USA) 
 
 
 Case No. Complainant. Respondent Domain 
names 
Decision Panelists Comments 
53 D2011-1407 Heimbs 
Kaffee GmbH 










Rindforth, P. (SWE) 
Lodigiani, A. (ITA) 








Kwang Pyo Kim 
utv.com  Denied 
 
Meijboom, A. (NED) 
Brown, N. 
(AUS/GBR) 
Park, A. (USA, ROK) 
 







Transfer Barbero, L. (ITA) 
Chang, M. (KOR) 















Lyon, R. (USA) 
Chang, M. (KOR) 
Pereira Dos Santos, 
M. (BRA) 
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Kwangpyo Kim flynet.com Transfer Alexiev, A. (BUL) 













Alexiev, A. (BUL) 
Brown, N. 
(AUS/GBR) 
 
